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Purpose:   This study researches the impact of hedging disclosure on the 
hedging premium. 
Methodology:   Quantitative approach using multiple regression analysis.  
Theoretical Perspectives:  The theoretical framework gives an overview over risk 
management in general and the value creation effect of hedging, 
followed by an outline of empirical research on disclosure and 
the advantages of improved disclosure to a firm.  
Empirical foundation:  The paper is based on a Sample of 193 companies listed on the 
Swedish stock market of which 115 were identified as hedgers 
and 78 as non-hedgers.  
Conclusions:   In conclusion, it was found that the level of IFRS requirement 
compliance for the Swedish listed firms assessed within our 
sample is lower than expected, especially considering the fact 
that IFRS is a mandatory listing requirement of the Swedish 
stock exchange. In our study, we also found an indication for a 
positive impact of good hedging disclosure on the hedging 
premium. Based on our initial model, when firms comply with 
IFRS requirements at the 90% threshold and provide about 
60% additional information while controlling for accessibility 
of the information provided, the increase in the hedging 
premium was found to be around 4.10%. In addition, contrary 
to what we expected, controlling for IFRS compliance at 90% 
threshold, additional disclosure did not create a higher 
premium on firm’s value than IFRS. 
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1  Introduction 
Previous empirical research has developed many theoretical frameworks to explain the 
motives behind risk management and provide evidence that hedging does add value to the 
firm. However, the effect of disclosure on firm value has often been researched separately 
and the effect of hedging disclosure on the hedging premium is still largely untested today. 
This provides us with an opportunity to bring these two areas together, adding on to prior 
research undertaken within these fields.  This paper aims to bridge the theoretical gap 
between the risk management and transparency research by testing if risk management 
disclosure has an effect on the hedging premium. We use foreign exchange risk as a proxy 
for risk management in line with previous research. Our sample consists of 193 non-
financial Swedish firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange in 2009 from which 115 
were classified as Hedger and assessed for their disclosure according to IFRS criteria as well 
as additional criteria defined to identify good disclosure company.  
1.1 Background Information  
In Miller and Modigliani (1961), they argued that risk management is irrelevant under their 
assumptions of the capital market. However, in reality, the M&M propositions do not hold 
since the existing market conditions are not frictionless.  
Moving forward, many other researchers have hypothesized the invalidity of the M&M 
theorem and state that risk management does add value to the firm. For example, Myers 
(1977) and Froot et al (1993) have proposed that risk management helps to reduce the 
conflict among equity and debt holders. In other papers such as Smith and Stulz (1985), 
argued that risk management lowers the cost of financial distress and in Graham and Smith 
(1999), they argued for the tax incentives as a motive for risk management. However, while 
these studies have indicated theoretical frameworks for the motives behind risk management, 
they have not provided evidence for the impact on firm’s value as a result of risk 
management activities.  
Allayannis and Weston (2001) were the first to provide some evidence of the impact of risk 
management on firm value. In their study, they focused on the use of currency derivatives 
mainly used to hedge foreign exchange risk as they argued that currency derivatives are the 
most commonly used derivatives for firms and also, foreign exchange risks are usually a 
common risk factor across firms. Basing upon their findings and methods, other researchers 
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reported additional findings on the impact of risk management on the firm value. However, 
the majority of these studies focus either on regions, industries or if the firms choose to 
hedge currency, interest rate or commodity price risks. For example, in Jin and Jorion (2004), 
they found that among the US oil and gas producers, hedging do not result in a positive 
premium on the firm value. In contrast Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2005) found in their 
study of the US airline industry that, when the firms hedge their jet fuel, there is a 
corresponding premium observed for the firm value. Nain (2005) on the other hand, 
observed that the premium theory is only valid when the firm decision to hedge is compared 
with the general trend in the industry.  
While there are a large number of research covering risk management, its underlying factors 
and the impact on firm’s value, the research on transparency has only been covered on a 
theoretical basis. In Forssbaeck and Oxelheim (2006), they argued that the concept of 
transparency is a relatively new phenomenon, recently receiving scientific interest. They 
found that there was only 32 instances of the word ‘transparency’ appearing in published 
working papers in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) between the years 
1974-2005 with the bulk of them appearing after 2000 in tandem with the major corporate 
scandal such as Enron and Worldcom.  
Basing upon the concept of information asymmetry, it was largely assumed that the more the 
firm discloses information to the public, the more symmetrical information becomes 
between the firm and the stakeholders. For example, Leuz and Wysocki (2008) provided 
some insights that the more the firm discloses its information, the lower the estimation risk 
and the less the investors have to guess about the firm. Most of the research on transparency 
provided explanations as to how transparency can be value creating for the firm but less 
evidence is found on the exact premium provided by additional transparency.  
To date, Muller and Verschoor (2008) is the only study, which tested if risk management 
disclosure creates value in the firm. They aimed to test the hypothesis if there exist a positive 
relationship between the foreign currency derivatives disclosure (proxy using FRS13) and 
the firm’s currency exposure.  
Yet, despite the wealth of existing literature on transparency, there are still no studies that 
test the relationship between risk management disclosures on the firm’s hedging premium. 
This provides us with an opportunity to look into this specific area and provide some 
evidence if good hedging disclosure does impact the hedging premium.    
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1.2 Introduction to the Swedish Economy  
For a small and open economy such as Sweden, Swedish firms are highly active in the 
international trade arena. A remarkably high proportion of Swedish firms is involved in 
exporting activities and is dependent on external trade (Greenaway et al, 2005). This 
indicates that these firms are exposed to a high level of macroeconomic factors such as 
foreign exchange risks, interest rate risks and commodity price risks. In addition, the volatile 
nature of the Swedish Kroners makes Swedish firms exceptionally more susceptible to the 
risk of foreign exchange fluctuations than other companies in the European Union, which 
shares Euro as the common currency. For example, Nydahl (2001) studied the effects of 
volatility of exchange rate on the firm value in Sweden. He found that 26% of the Swedish 
firms in his sample are exposed to a high degree of foreign exchange risk and that the use of 
derivatives is negatively related to the degree of exposure. 
In Alkeback and Hagelin (1998), they found that 52% of nonfinancial firms engage in 
derivatives usage in Sweden as compared to 39% in USA. Some of the factors that have 
been raised in support of this finding includes the fact that Sweden being a small open 
economy, is more active in the international trade arena therefore Swedish firms have a 
higher level of exposure to foreign exchange risks in comparison to firms in the USA. 
Moreover, the interest rates in Sweden are more volatile motivating the use of derivatives to 
hedge the price risks. While US firms have had a longer history of derivative trading, the 
derivatives market in Sweden is less mature. Interestingly, their findings also pointed out 
significant evidence that Swedish firms tend to hedge a larger proportion of their balance 
sheet in comparison to the firms in the USA.  
Alkeback, Hagelin and Pramborg (2004) did a recent follow up survey from Alkeback and 
Hagelin (1998) and found similar trends. They found that 59% of Swedish firms uses 
derivatives in 2003 and most firms use derivatives to manage their foreign exchange risks. 
This indicates that risk management use has increased in Sweden as firms try to reduce their 
exposure to macroeconomic factors such as foreign exchange. In 2003, Swedish firms tend 
to use derivatives to manage their contractual commitments, a stark difference from the 
balance sheet hedge results obtained in 1996. The authors suggest that this indicate evidence 
for Swedish firms becoming more similar to the firms in other countries with respect to this 
factor.  
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From a separate study by Hagelin (2003), he examines a sample of Swedish firms use of 
currency derivatives and the determinants of the firms’ hedging decisions. The research aims 
to study the difference between currency derivative usage for managing translation and 
transaction exposure. From his research he found that larger Swedish firms tend to use 
currency derivatives more than small firms supporting the theory that fixed costs is a barrier 
to derivatives usage. Observations from the multivariate tests he conducted, also indicated 
that Swedish firms tend to use currency derivatives to manage their transaction exposure to 
manage translation exposure for the purpose of increasing the firm value.  
Therefore based on the analysis of previous research, the Swedish market provides a perfect 
environment to test if risk management disclosure does impact the hedging premium as the 
nature for the economy generally allows comparability of foreign exchange risk management 
among the firms due to a overall high level of exposure.  
1.3 Research Areas 
Based on the analysis above, we have established that there is a gap in current research 
whereby the effect of risk management disclosures on the firm value has not been touched 
upon. In this paper we aim to bring together these two topics and provide some insights on 
the inter-relatedness of a more transparent risk management disclosure and the firm’s value.  
This paper aims to look into these specific areas as follow:  
• To what extent do Swedish firms comply with IFRS requirements? 
• Does good hedging disclosure impact the hedging premium?  
• Is there a managerial implication for the type of information revealed by the firm?  
1.4 Delimitations 
One of the most important delimitation on our research is whether the firms hedges or 
speculate in their hedging positions. This information is not readily available and limited; 
especially more so since our study is based on information from databases and companies’ 
annual reports as such the outreach to such information is weak. In addition, in our coding 
method, we were unable to assess if the firm is providing a true picture of their risk 
management activities and if information provided in their annual report are of good quality. 
Therefore, we based our study on the information provided within annual report as it is, 
without assessing the quality or completeness of the information provided.  
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1.5 Structure of the paper 
The structure for this paper is as follow:  In Section 2, we discuss previous empirical studies 
regarding the topics of risk management and transparency. We will also discuss previous 
research regarding transparency and disclosure. In Section 3, we discuss our methodology, 
data and model for our research. In Section 4, we provide our empirical findings and in 
Section 5, we provide our analysis and discussions regarding our findings. Section 6 
concludes this paper.  
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2  Literature Review  
In	  this	  section,	  we	  present	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  underlying	  the	  two	  topics,	  which	  
are	   of	   interest	   in	   our	   study.	   We	   will	   first	   present	   the	   framework	   and	   findings	  
concerning	   risk	   management	   in	   general	   before	   presenting	   the	   empirical	   research	  
behind	   disclosure	   and	   transparency.	   Finally,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   this	   section,	   we	   would	  
frame	  our	  hypotheses	  according	  to	  the	  research	  findings.	  	  
2.1 Theoretical frameworks behind risk management motives 
According to the Miller and Modigliani (M&M) theorem, the value of the firm is not 
affected by any risk management decisions undertaken by the firm (Miller and Modigliani, 
1961). In the theorem, M&M made 4 bold assumptions regarding a frictionless market 
environment: 
• There is a perfect capital market whereby there are no transaction costs, no taxes and 
no bankruptcy cost. 
• There are no information asymmetries and every player has equal access to the same 
and identical information on market prices.  
• Firms’ investment decisions are taken as given and are not influenced by financing 
decision (capital structure irrelevance).  
• Firms and individuals are also able to issue the same securities under the exact same 
terms to the market. (Culp, 2002) 
Therefore according to these assumptions above, financial and risk management policies will 
not affect the value of the firm (Culp, 2002) and financial decisions of the management will 
not create value for the firm if it does not affect either the firm’s ability to operate or it’s 
future investment decisions (Hillier et al, 2009). In addition, it is also implied that if 
derivatives products are fairly priced then the net present value (NPV) of any risk 
management project will be zero and hedging does not add value (Culp, 2002). 
However, most of these assumptions stated above are clearly unrealistic and do not hold in 
the real world. In reality, due to the existence of market friction, risk management can add 
value to the firm due in the 4 different ways as listed below: 
• Tax incentives of risk management  
• Reducing managerial aversion through risk management 
• Reducing cost of financial distress within firms 
• Underinvestment problem and risk management  
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2.1.1 Tax Incentives of Risk Management 
Taxes exist in the real world and this adds friction to the capital markets and taxes also 
distort earnings of the firm. One of the potential advantages of hedging is through increasing 
the value of the firm by reducing the volatility of cash flows for the firm. Smith and Stulz 
(1985) have previously indicted that volatility is expensive for firms with convex tax 
functions. Under their analysis, they argued that hedging is beneficial if it results in an after 
tax income that is more concave. With this in mind, corporations facing a convex tax 
schedule will choose to hedge in order to minimize their tax liabilities and maximize their 
cash flows. In Graham and Smith (1998), they hypothesize that firms facing a convex tax 
function are more likely to hedge to reduce their tax liabilities and reduce the volatility of 
their taxable income.  
On the other hand, a different research by Graham and Rogers (2002), hypothesize that there 
are two tax incentives in relation to hedging, (i) to increase the firm’s debt capacity and (ii) 
for interest tax deductions when the firm faces a convex tax schedule. They argued that 
according to Leland (1998), hedging helps to reduce probability of financial distress and/or 
increase the stability of income resulting in increases in debt capacity and this in turn 
increases interest deductions and reduces tax liabilities. Similarly, Graham and Smith (1998), 
found statistically significant evidence that suggest firms hedge to increase their debt 
capacity and interest deductions, which results in lower tax liabilities.  
2.1.2 Reducing cost of financial distress with risk management  
Smith and Stulz (1985) argued that hedging helps to reduce the volatility of cash flow and 
therefore probability of financial distress hence increasing firms’ value. Through reducing 
the volatility of cash flows it helps to predict the level of liquidity within the firm in ensuring 
it has enough funds to meet its obligations. Contrary to the assumptions made by M&M 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961), bankruptcy cost is not zero and in fact, it can be very costly 
to a firm. Therefore, through hedging, firms can seek to reduce the probability of defaulting 
by ensuring a smoother earnings profile, which can maintain the liquidity demands of the 
firm and ensure that the covenants do not become binding. Hedging also potentially results 
in a stronger ability to increase debt capacity, this leads to an increase in the present value of 
tax shield of debt interest payments. 
In the study by Graham and Smith (2002), they found consistent evidence to prove that firms 
hedge in response to large expected cost of financial distress. However their results found 
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inconsistent evidence for hedging in response to past distress. In a separate study by 
Punanandam (2008), he argued that when a firm faces financial distress, shareholders engage 
in ex-post hedging activities even though they had no initial commitment to do so. As such, 
shareholders trade off the risk-shifting argument to limit their risks as a result of financial 
distress. In his study, he found that there is an inverted U-shape between financial distress 
costs and hedging and a non-monotonic relationship between leverage and the hedge level. 
Howton and Perfect (1998), on the other hand, found that there is a positive relationship 
between the use of hedging and the expected financial distress.  
2.1.3 Reducing managerial aversion through risk management  
 Previous literature on agency cost reflects the potential conflict between managers and 
stakeholders. From a shareholders perspective, the agency theory states that management 
acts as an agent for the shareholders and should take on decisions that will maximize 
shareholders value. However, there is potential conflict that might not influence this 
behavior. Smith and Stulz (1985) also stated that management needs to be given proper 
incentives or else they will not maximize shareholders value. They went on to state that that 
managers tend to hedge more when transaction costs decreases because hedging actually 
increases the manager’s expected end period wealth. Therefore, managers with a concave 
compensation function tend to hedge more to reduce the firm’s cash flow volatility. Hedging, 
as argued by Smith and Stulz (1985), allows managers to undertake variance-increasing 
positive NPV projects that increase the value of the firm.  
In a study done by Graham and Rogers (2002), they found that the coefficient on the delta of 
the amount of the CEO’s stock and options to be positively related to risk management. This 
is also consistent with the findings by Knopf, Nam and Thorton (2002), which found that 
firms tend to hedge more as the sensitivity of management’s stocks and option portfolio 
relative to the stock prices increases. In a different study by Tufano (1996), he found that 
managers who hold more gold options tend to manage less gold price risk and vice versa. 
These finding suggests that managerial risk aversion does influence the hedging policies in 
the firm.    
2.1.4 Underinvestment problems and risk management  
According to Culp (2002), when there exist a potential conflict between debt and equity 
holders, risk management can be valuable to address such conflicts so that the monitoring 
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costs of ensuring that management preserve stockholder value.  Myers (1977) stated that one 
of the results from a potential conflict between debt and equity holders is under-investment. 
This is the also known as the debt overhang problem and the asset substitution problem. In 
the presence of a firm’s capital structure (violation of the MM assumption), when the firm is 
highly leveraged, then the firm might choose to pass up on a positive NPV projects because 
the financing for these projects are too costly. Equity holders also might refuse to take on 
positive NPV projects because the benefits from those projects tend to go to the hands of the 
creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore in these situations, undertaking a risk 
management activity can help the firm to ensure that its leverage does not impede future 
investments.  
The underinvestment problem can also be analyzed from a general framework developed by 
Froot, et al (1993). Under their framework, they argued that risk management can increase 
firm’s value as it allow the firm to ensure it has sufficient cash flow to undertake positive 
NPV projects. A firm’s value is created through undertaking positive NPV projects. 
However, these projects can only be undertaken if the firm has sufficient internal cash flows 
since external financings are costly and these internal cash flows are also susceptible to 
disruptions by external risk factors such as interest rates and exchange rates. Therefore, they 
argued that through ensuring that these risks are controlled, the firm could continue to 
undertake positive NPV projects in the future.  
According to a study by Mian (1996), he found that firms tend to hedge more when there is a 
large presence of investment opportunities and the underinvestment problems aggravates the 
deviation of a firm’s market value from growth options rather than from assets in place. In a 
separate study by Bartram (2000), he stated that a firm with high leverage might end up 
taking on risky projects (asset substitution problem) in line with the theoretical framework 
presented by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Therefore, through corporate hedging, firms 
could aim to reduce the agency costs if it reduces the riskiness of investment projects. The 
importance of reducing riskiness can be traced back to the cost of borrowing as the lower the 
perceived risk of the projects, the lower the interest rate and less stringent the covenants 
demanded by creditors.  
Grezy, et al (1997) found that firms with an extensive risk exposure are more likely to 
engage in a higher level of hedging and a factor underlying this finding is that firms use 
derivatives to reduce volatility in their cash flows for future growth opportunities. Also, in 
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Nance et al (1993) they found that the more growth options a firm has in their investment 
opportunities, the more they engage in hedging. In addition, Gay and Nam (1998) also found 
evidence that there is a positive relationship between growth opportunities and the firm’s 
value and this effect is more pronounced for firms with low cash stocks and whose 
investment opportunities are less correlated with their internal cash flow. 
2.2 Evidence of hedging premium in firm’s value  
The first empirical study testing for a direct relationship between hedging and the firm’s 
value was done by Allayannis and Weston (2001). In their study, they used a sample of 720 
large non-financial US firms between 1990 and 1995. Within their sample, they focused 
largely on a subsample of firms, which are exposed to foreign exchange rate risk through the 
sales from foreign operations and compared them with firms, which have similar exposure 
level. They analyzed the difference in the firm’s value depending on whether the firms hedge 
their foreign currency risks or not, using Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm’s value. Their study 
found that there is significance evidence to prove that hedging does result in a higher firm 
value, on average, firms that are exposed to exchange rate risk and hedge this exposure are 
given a 4.87% premium than firms that do not hedge their exposures.  
The next study complementing the findings of Allaynnis and Weston (2001) was a separate 
study done by Carter, Rogers and Simkins (2005). In their study, they analyzed the effect of 
hedging jet fuel within the US airline industry and its impact on the firm value. The authors 
hypothesize that since jet fuel costs are hedge-able, airlines, which are aiming at expansion, 
should indicate a positive relationship of firm value and jet fuel future price hedge. Through 
hedging jet fuel prices, airlines are able to manage the volatility of cash flow and therefore 
improve the value of the firm. From their study, they found that jet fuel hedging has a 
positive relationship with the value of the airline. The hedging premium of 10%, which they 
obtained, was however, larger than the premium found by Allayannis and Weston (2001).  
Nain (2005) studied the effect of hedging on the firm value through a different technique. He 
argued that the existing wealth of research on hedging and value creation neglects the 
consideration of the firm’s incentive to hedge. In his study, Nain (2005) used an illustrative 
Cournot-Oligopoly model (game theory) approach to motivate his analysis. He hypothesized 
that in an industry where most of the players are unhedged, then the product prices for the 
players will co-vary with the costs and the profit volatility of cash flows will be low. 
However, the hedged players will experience constant costs as well as constant prices 
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therefore making the eventual profit volatility higher than their unhedged counterparts. 
When the industry constitute a large number of players who hedged, then the unhedged firms 
will face a more volatile profits than its hedged counterparts. Therefore, Nain (2005) argues 
that the value creation resulting from hedging is depending on the actions of the competitors 
within the industry. In his paper, the results indicated that when the industry in general does 
not hedge, then the results of a depreciation of 10% in the external value of the currency of a 
firm results in an overall inflation of 1.8% however when 50% of the industry hedged, then 
the overall inflation is only 0.9%. This indicates that the sensitivity of the industry price to 
exchange rate improves when significant of the players within the industry hedges. In 
addition, Nain (2005) also reported evidence that hedging premium exists only when the 
majority of the industry players engage in hedging activities. When the firm chooses to 
remain unhedged while the majority of its competitors hedged, then the firm tends to suffer a 
value discount.  
A study by Kim et al (2006) found that non-operationally hedged firms tend to engage in 
more financial hedging relative to their level of foreign exchange risk exposure and contrary 
is true for operationally hedged firms.  They also found that regardless of whether the firm 
uses operational or financial hedging, the effect of valuation is the same, an increase in firm 
value. Their analysis indicated that when a firm uses financial hedging, the average premium 
on firm value is 5.4% and this premium ranges from 4.8%-17.9% if the firm uses operational 
hedging.  
In Allayannis, Les and Miller (2007), they found that controlling for additional variable -
corporate governance, the premium is higher on the firm’s value. In their study, they used 
several proxies for internal and firm specific corporate governance and through their analysis 
they found that for firms with strong internal corporate governance, the firm’s valuation is 
higher. This study provides evidence that risk management adds value to a firm however this 
hedging premium is only present when there is a strong presence of corporate governance.  
Clark and Judge (2008) in their study looked at the different hedging strategies that a firm 
can adopt (such as debt-based, derivatives, swaps, etc) and their impact on the Q values. 
Their findings indicated that foreign exchange derivatives strategies contributed to a 14% 
increase in the firm value while debt-based strategies do not yield any statistically significant 
results. When looking at the overall results, the size of premium for hedgers is around 12% 
and when looking specifically at the various hedging strategies, the results range between 
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11-34%. Their findings yielded higher results than those in Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
and Nain (2005). 
Moeller and MacKay (2007) looked at the value of corporate risk management from the 
point of view of firm’s revenues and costs and the input prices. They argued that hedging 
adds value only when revenue function is concave in product prices or when costs are 
convex in product prices. They studied the nonlinearities of revenue and costs and its impact 
on the second and higher moments of the input as well as output prices. Their results 
indicated that by hedging concave revenue, the premium obtained is 2-3%. When they 
validate their results by including additional variables such as real options, vertical 
integration and diversification, they obtained similar results and this indicates that the market 
reward firms for hedging when the hedge creates value and penalize firms for hedging if the 
hedge destroys firm value. 
In a separate study by Jin and Jorion (2004), they studied a sample of 119 US oil and gas 
producers between the period of 1998 – 2001. Contrary to other studies on value creation 
and risk management, their study did not yield similar results. They found that although 
hedging reduces the sensitivity of the firm’s stocks to oil and gas prices, hedging does not 
result in higher firm value. They provided some explanations for their results and argued that 
within the oil and gas industries, investors can easily identify the exposures to oil and gas 
prices therefore there is presence of information symmetries. Therefore, they take positions 
in oil and gas firms simply to gain exposures to oil and gas prices. When the firm hedge, the 
investors loses their exposure and as such they do not provide a premium on the firm value. 
This indicates that hedging is only value creating in certain industries and not for all.   
2.3 Previous studies on financial disclosure 
2.3.1 Transparency influencing the cost of Capital  
Leaving behind the theoretical world of M&M (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) and therefore 
their assumption of symmetric information in the market, asymmetric information becomes a 
critical factor in adding friction within the corporate world.  The most basic explanation of 
the underlying adverse selection problem is given in Akerlof’s market for lemons (1970) 
where he describes that due to a lack of transparency, buyers are not willing to pay more 
than the minimum price for a low quality product, as they are unable to assess the quality of 
the offered product. Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) applied this concept to the 
	   16	  
capital markets by developing the Pecking Order Theory. Based on the assumptions that 
investors believe a firm will only issue equity when its equity is overpriced. As such, since 
investors are unable to tell the true quality of the stocks, they are only willing to pay a 
minimum amount for the securities. This indicates that there is a discount on the security 
offered. Therefore, firms will not issue their securities unless they are overpriced to avoid a 
discount on their securities, a term known as the pooling equilibrium. Investors knowing this 
will only pay the minimum amount for securities offered, resulting in the separating 
equilibrium. The Pecking Order Theory also conceptualized this adverse selection problem 
by placing equity at the end of the chain to indicate the risk avoidance of investors and firms.  
Research on estimation risk showed that there could be a possible link between disclosure 
and estimation risk. Leuz and Wysocki (2008) researched on previous empirical findings 
regarding estimation risk, which, states that, the lower the disclosure the higher the 
estimation risk. In other words, estimation risk proposed that the less an investor know, the 
more he is expected to estimate. They found in agreement with previous empirical studies 
decreasing assessed covariance of a firms cash flow in comparison with other firms when 
quality or precisions of information increases, moving the firm’s cost of capital closer to the 
risk free rate. In another study by Lamberz et al. (2007b), it is argued that the information 
effect applies to all covariance terms, therefore only the firm specific variance term could be 
diversified away by investors in liquid markets. This findings support the impact of 
transparency on a firm’s cost of capital. 
 
In a separate study by Francis et al (2007), they investigated the relationship between cost of 
capital, earnings quality and voluntary disclosure using a sample of 677 firms in 2001. Their 
study provides a strong point for consideration while analysing the assumption of estimation 
risk done by Leuz and Wysocki (2008) which does not take earnings quality into account. 
Earnings quality refers to the fact that opaque financial accounting or earnings management 
would depress the quality of disclosure. In their study, Francis et al (2007) found that when 
conditioned for earnings quality, the effect of disclosure on the cost of capital is significantly 
reduced hence indicating that the effect of disclosure on cost of capital strongly hinges on 
the quality of the disclosure. However, Hribar and Nichols (2007) and Liu and Wysocki 
(2007) found that the accruals quality measure used by Francis et al. does not distinguish 
between the reporting activities and the properties of its operating processes. Therefore, they 
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find the relation between accruals quality and cost of capital as used by Francis et al. (2007) 
to fall short in their robustness test.   
 
The transparency factor have also been addressed by regulations, first of all through 
accounting standards such as International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and US 
General Accounting and Audit Practices (GAAP) in addition to the wealth of corporate 
governance codes available to guide additional disclosure. Subsequently, information 
disclosure is also addressed internally through companies’ public and investor relations.  
According to Oxelheim (2006), research on transparency was mainly undertaken after the 
year 2000 indicating the influence of accounting scandals like Enron and financial crisis’s on 
the demand for greater disclosure.  Therefore, we have observed that accounting standards 
and governance have been strengthened post-scandals. For example, the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(2002) in the US was enacted to mandate companies to release more information as well as 
amendments made to IFRS and US GAAP, which require additional disclosure made by the 
firms. These thus aid to create a greater convergence level within the international standards.  
However, in comparison to research on transparency, research relating to the effects of 
information asymmetry on the cost of capital (e.g. Demsetz, 1968) has started much earlier.   
The above analysis indicates that the fundamental concept of transparency and disclosure 
has been around a long time masquerading as the problem of information asymmetry. In 
Oxelheim (2008) he argued that the concepts of transparency and information asymmetry are 
essentially the same, albeit appearing in different terms. The term transparency was only 
coined after the post-scandal of Enron and Worldcom in 2001 where the demand for more 
information and disclosure became more apparent.  
 In a study done by Karamanou and Nishiotis (2009), they showed that by using a return 
based study they found some evidence of a decreasing cost of capital for firms that voluntary 
applied the International Accounting Standards (IAS). Furthermore, they also stated that a 
further reduction of cost of capital was found when there was a mandatory introduction of 
IFRS.  Karamanou and Nishiotis (2009) reasoned that by using a return based study they 
would overcome the measurement error when calculating the cost of capital. They referred 
to their measurement error for implied cost of capital as stated by Easton and Monahan 
(2010) who in their findings argued that the model developed by Fama and French (1997) 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to measure the rate of return resulted in a 
standard error of the industry expected rate of return estimates of more than 3 percent. Hail 
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and Leuz (2004) also referred to the model developed by Fama and French (1997) as a major 
limitation when they evaluated the effect of cross listings on the cost of capital. This 
indicates that a return based study might be more accurate and reliable in measuring the cost 
of capital and based on the analysis above, the voluntary application of IAS does result in a 
lower cost of capital.  
Schrand and Leuz (2009) elaborated on the argument of the influence of former accounting 
scandals in their paper that studied the relation between corporate disclosure and the cost of 
capital using the example of the “Enron shock” and its influence on the cost of capital in an 
event study. Through the use of an exogenous shock (the “Enron shock”), Schrand and Leuz 
(2009) mitigated the problem of omitted variable resulting from cross-sectional studies. 
Using a sample of 1,868 firms available in COMPUSTAT, they found that corporate 
disclosure for investor information and the cost of capital are building one of the 
fundamental relations in finance and accounting. In their study they found consistent results 
as Diamond and Verrecchia, (1991); Easley and O.’Hara, (2004); Lambert et al. (2007), 
which indicated that there is a negative relationship between increased information quality 
and the cost of capital. The more information quality there is in the disclosure, the lower the 
cost of capital charged to the firm.  
 
Additionally, there are also other research papers, which argued that higher quality 
information is a method for firms wanting to achieve a lower systematic risk and expected 
returns. Schrand and Leuz (2009) argued that firms with increasing cost of capital would 
tend to increase their level of disclosure. The approach used to measure increased disclosure 
within their paper is mainly quantitative and based on pages filed within financial reports. 
However, they also introduced the qualitative element through the ratings of different 
sections of the annual report according to importance as well as if the additional information 
revealed is required or not by the Securities Exchange Commission.  Furthermore, 
complementary interim disclosure is found have improved, as a response to increased capital 
cost and higher financing needs. They found that upon the Enron shock, firms responded by 
increasing the disclosure in both the interim and annual reports. The beta shock was also 
found to be associated with increased firm disclosure after the Enron shock.  
 
Botosan (1997) performed an industry specific test, limiting her sample to one industry and 
did a research on the effect of disclosure on the cost of equity capital. Acknowledging the 
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limitations of CAPM, she included empirical proxies such as number of analyst following 
the firm, beta, market value, book value of assets, PPE, sales, number of employees and 
disclosure score (D-score) in her regression model to assess the impact of increased 
disclosure. Botosan (1997) computes the D-Score based on the level of voluntary 
information provided on background information, summary of historical results, key non-
financial statistics, projected information and management discussion and analysis. Using 
the above-mentioned criteria, Botosan (1997) found in her study that increased disclosure 
helps to reduce the cost of capital for companies with comparable low analysts’ coverage. 
When the firm has a lower number of analysts following it, then the effect of forecast 
information and key non-financial statistics disclosure becomes more pronounced. She also 
found that when the firm has a higher number of analysts following it, then the disclosure of 
historical information is more important for the firm to obtain a lower cost of capital.   
 
In addition, the study of Leuz and Wysocki (2008) supported the argument by Botosan 
(1997) above by stating that when a lesser known firms disclosure more it allows investors 
to be more aware of the firms and hence widen the investor base. This will also help firms to 
reduce the cost of capital and improves the risk sharing effect. They also found this effect to 
be more pronounced among large firms with more analyst and investor coverage. In addition, 
they argued that if the investor base is small, the arbitrage effect will be large since some 
investors know of these stocks which other investors does not know. When these firms 
increase their level of disclosure then the former investors will benefit from an arbitrage of a 
higher firms’ value. This supports the general consensus that more disclosure helps to 
increase the value of the firm.  
 
A follow up study by Botosan and Plumlee (2000) concluded that the cost of capital 
improvement depends on the type of disclosure.  They argued that by increasing the amount 
of information reported in the annual report, firms would benefit by obtaining a lower cost of 
capital by approximately 1% (obtained by taking the difference between the most and least 
transparent firms). In addition, when firms are more transparent in other company 
publications the difference in the magnitude of effect increased to approximately 2%. They 
also additionally found some evidence supporting the claim of management that more timely 
information increases cost of capital. They concluded that by aggregating across different 
types of disclosures might lead to a biased conclusion and loss of information.  
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Lang and Lundholm (2001) studied a sample of firms that used increased disclosure within a 
6 months time frame before their equity offerings with the aim of increasing their stock 
performance. They found that within this time frame, an increase in the level of disclosure 
was followed by large price declines after the offering, while companies following a long 
term strategy of high disclosure level experience only minor price declines when announcing 
the equity issue. However, Lang and Lundholm (2001) conclude that this short term “hype” 
could imply a lower cost of capital for companies following this strategy. He argued that 
firms following a long-term disclosure policy would not face any unusual returns behavior 
while firms following the short-term disclosure policy would face consistent negative returns. 
This indicates that disclosure could aid to a momentary reduction to the cost of capital upon 
equity offering.  
 
In a more specific approach relating to management disclosure of hedging, Reynolds-
Moehrle (2005) argued that the disclosure of hedging, signals to the market that transitory 
shocks are not influencing earnings and therefore earnings become a more transparent 
measure of the results of operations.  Reynolds-Moehrle (2005) stated that firm obtains a 
more transparent value creating activities by eliminating the transitional shocks and noise 
through a more thorough hedging disclosure. Therefore, she claimed that associated with 
increased earnings predictability there will be an increase in information of earnings 
surprises, and also an increase in the earnings response coefficients.   
 
In a study done by Sapra and Sinn (2007), they argued that when a firm cannot credibly 
communicate the hedge-able portion of their risk exposure, then a more transparent 
disclosure would distort the firm’s hedging activities. They emphasized that distortions 
depend crucially on (i) firms’ information quality about their project types and (ii) the 
market’s prior beliefs about whether or not firms have hedge-able projects. They argued that 
only if both criteria above are at a high level then there would be more speculation in the 
economy than socially optimal. If they are low, Sapra and Sinn (2007) found that there is 
under-hedging relative to the social optimum level in the economy. They also concluded that 
at the average disclosure quality level, increase disclosure tends to result in excessive 
speculation engaged by the firm.  
 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) developed a framework for analyzing the firm’s risk 
communication. They argued that in information disclosure, what is important is the content 
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that the firm discloses instead of how much information they provide. In previous empirical 
studies, many researchers used quantity as a proxy for disclosure. Beretta and Bozzolan 
(2004) criticized this method by indicating that quantity is not a satisfactory proxy because 
the methodology used does not take into consideration the richness of the information 
disclosed. They underlined the importance of the narrative component in financial reports to 
clarify and validate quantitative measures as well as to elaborate on value drivers and the 
risk faced and subsequently the expected impact on future profits. Another important 
element they found is the degree of forward looking disclosure available for investors in line 
with the findings from Francis and Schipper (1999) which states that the more onward 
looking the information provided by the firm, the more important it is for investors. 
Following the guidance from CICA and ICAEW, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) defined risk 
disclosure as the communication of information that includes the firms’ strategies, 
characteristics, operations and other external factors that could potentially affect the future 
performance of the firm. The framework proposed within the paper consists out of four 
dimensions: the content of information disclosed; the economic sign attributed to expected 
impacts; the type of measures used to quantify and qualify the expected impacts; (the 
outlook orientation of risk communication) and the managerial approach to the management 
of risk. Due to a lack of academic research on contents and semantic properties Beretta and 
Bozzolan (2004) refer to guidance from professional bodies as AICPA (1994), CICA (2001), 
FASB (2001) and ICAEW (2002) as well as on research on risk assessment and analyses. 
The content of disclosure proposed is narrowed down to the following categories: strategy, 
company characteristics (financial structure, corporate structure, technological structure, and 
organization), business processes as well as environment around the company (PESTEL1).  
Furthermore, they also considered the dilution of the disclosure through its accessibility 
within the annual report, which Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) are refer to information “hiding 
the needle in a haystack”. From their study, they have proven that both industry and size 
effect does not influence their proposed framework and index measures as it focuses on 
disclosure quality and not quantity. The core finding of the paper is that quality and richness 
of the information disclosed is more important than quantity. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
further remark that an investor’s strategy for risk disclosure analysis should have an 
influence on companies’ disclosure. Also, they noticed that risk disclosure is also dependent 
on the environment the firm is operating in.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  PESTEL indicates Political, Economic, Societal, Technological, Environmental and Legal structure surrounding the firm.	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Muller and Verschoor (2008) researched on the value relevance of Foreign Currency 
Derivatives (FCD) hedging disclosure of European non-financial firms and found that firms 
mainly use FCD for hedging and non-speculative reasons. Contrary to other studies, they did 
not find strong effects of disclosure on the firm’s value. Instead, they found statistically 
weak effects of derivatives disclosure. They provided some explanation for their findings 
and reasoned that either manager used FCD only to hedge a small portion of the currency 
risk in an unsystematic way or the investors making systematic errors when assessing the 
impact of FCD disclosed by the firm and the firms’ initial risk exposures.  
 
In addition, Cooke (1992) also provided some evidence in his study that there is an industry 
effect of how much a firm should disclosure and the effects of disclosure on the firm value is 
industry-dependent. For example the high level of R&D disclosure in the pharmaceutical 
sector is dictated by the investors need for information to invest within that industry. 
Therefore the content of the disclosure is dependent on the industry-specific criteria. Firms, 
which disclose information, that are not relevant will not obtain a higher value.  
2.3.2 Optimum Disclosure Level 
As discussed in the previous section increased transparency aims at decreasing information 
asymmetry and therefore a reduction in the risk premium. The main counterbalance points 
mentioned by Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) are the direct costs of disclosure as well as 
cost arising due to the possibility of losing competitive advantage to rival firms. This is in 
line with the arguments set forth by Graham et al (2005) where they stated that the main 
barrier to increase voluntary disclosure are the concerns regarding revealing too much 
information for the benefit of competitors and the fear that they might not be able to keep up 
with the disclosure practice in the future. They went on to state that managers tend to reveal 
bad news at a faster rate than good news in order to maintain their credibility and promote a 
more transparent reporting although under some circumstances this might not be possible (to 
allow for deeper analysis and interpretations). They also found that for poorly performing 
firms, they tend to delay releasing bad news in comparison to healthy performing firms. 
These are again in line with the findings of Francis et al (2007), which indicate that firms 
with high earnings quality provide more voluntary disclosure.  
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Oxelheim (2008) reinforces previous empirical studies that supported the view that the lack 
of transparency results in information asymmetry between those who has the information 
(management) and those who need the information (investors). Theoretically, this gap in the 
knowledge of information tends to result in a premium on the cost of capital and a lower 
valuation for the firm. Upon the downfall of major corporations such as Enron and 
Worldcom, it was wrongfully assumed that the more information the company discloses, the 
better it is. However, Oxelheim (2008) argued that the more information an investor receives, 
the higher the possibility that he might be drowned in the information he obtained and 
therefore resulted in the investor being confused. As such, he argued that there should be an 
optimal point where the information disclosed is sufficient and beyond this point, additional 
information only seeks to confuse the receiver of that information. This optimal point also 
includes the point where additional information beyond this point might reveal competition-
sensitive information free for the firm’s competitors. Therefore, firms’ management has to 
balance the different perspective and considerations to ensure that neither too little nor too 
much information is disclosed to the public.  
2.4 Comments on Prior Research 
As observed above, there are many previous studies testing the effect of risk management on 
the firm’s value. Researchers have provided many strong theoretical frameworks and 
evidence however the findings are still largely contradictory and convergent. Observing the 
previous empirical research on risk management and value creation, we note that most 
studies used the same methodological approaches but the results are largely inconsistent 
indicating that there are additional differences such as time period, geographical coverage, 
industrial-factors and data sample that could provide some explanations for this observation.  
When we review the literature on disclosure, we find that most of the papers covered an 
extensive overview of the effect of a reduction in information asymmetry by testing the 
effect of greater disclosure on the cost of capital and equity risk premium. The framework 
for analyzing risk disclosure is still limited indicating that there is potential room for further 
evaluation and research within this area. In addition, it was observed that there is a lack in 
the value creation effect of additional disclosure of the firm’s hedging activities on the firm’s 
hedging premium.  
As mentioned earlier, there is no research studying the direct relationship of risk 
management disclosure and the firm’s hedging premium. Therefore, this paper aims to work 
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on this theoretical gap by bridging these two sets of literature. We acknowledge that the 
hedging premium is present and we would like to test for the effect of an additional variable 
– hedging disclosure and if there is a positive relationship between this variable on the firm’s 
hedging premium.  
2.5 Research Hypothesis  
Following the literature review above, we define our research hypothesis as follow: 
Hypothesis 1: A firm with a more transparent risk management disclosure obtains a 
higher hedging premium. 
We would expect a positive relationship between the firm’s risk management disclosure and 
the firm’s value consistent with previous disclosure research which states that the more 
transparent the disclosure, the lower information asymmetry there is and the higher the 
premium allocated to the firm. Consistent with previous research such as Luez and Wysocki 
(2008), we argue that the more transparent the disclosure, the investors are better able to 
understand the firm’s approach on risk management and the lower the probability of 
misevaluation or estimation. This is value adding as it reduces the cost of capital charged to 
the firm. As such, the hedging premium given to firms, which practice good hedging 
disclosure, should be higher than those that do not.  
Hypothesis 2: Investors value additional disclosure more than IFRS requirements.  
In addition, during the course of our research, we also would like to test on an additional 
hypothesis regarding the value-creation of different types of information. We argue that 
IFRS compliance should be less valuable as this provides the basis for a firm’s transparency 
and is made mandatory by the Stockholm Stock Exchange. Therefore, we would expect 
investors to react more positively to additional disclosure in comparison to IFRS compliance 
as additional disclosure indicates a more transparent company. In the event that the company 
does not strictly comply with IFRS requirements, voluntary disclosure should be more 
valuable for investors. This should be more significant in the case of a weak IFRS 
compliance regime. 
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3  Methodology 
In	   this	   section,	   we	   present	   our	   research	   approach	   and	   coding	   methodology.	   We	   will	  
also	   provide	   a	   detailed	   description	   of	   our	   data	   and	   sample	   before	   presenting	   the	  
variables	  and	  method	  used	  for	  our	  analysis.	   In	  addition,	  we	  also	  provide	  an	  evaluation	  
of	  the	  reliability	  and	  validity	  of	  the	  method	  used	  in	  our	  study.	  	   	  
3.1 Research Approach  
Previous empirical research has dug into the motives behind risk management and provides 
evidence that hedging does add value to the firm. However, the effect of disclosure on firm 
value has often been researched separately and the effect of hedging disclosure on firm value 
is still largely untested. This provides an opportunity to bring these two areas together, 
adding on to prior research undertaken within these fields.   
Therefore, we follow a deductive research approach, using previous empirical findings and 
literature review as a base, to develop a logical hypothesis regarding the disclosure effect on 
the firm’s hedging premium. Then, empirical data observations are collected from a sample 
of Swedish firms to test the effect of the hypothesis formed. By integrating the theoretical 
framework and the hypothesis, the aim of our study is to provide some insightful evidence 
regarding the effect of disclosure and the hedging premium in Sweden. 
In this paper, the research question we aim to test is whether a more transparent hedging 
disclosure of foreign exchange hedging activities creates a positive impact on the firm’s 
hedging premium. While we are focusing largely on the level of foreign exchange hedging 
activities, it is important to stress that the disclosure of other risk management activities can 
also influence the premium imposed on a firm. However, we model our methodology based 
on the work of Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Allayannis, Les and Miller (2007) which 
states that foreign exchange risk activities could be used as a proxy for the overall risk 
management activities of the firm. In line with their study, we would like to isolate the most 
common type of risk that the firm is exposed to which is foreign exchange risk. Considering 
the small and open Swedish economy, it is highly probably that Swedish firms will be 
exposed to currency exposures in their operations therefore, using foreign exchange risk, as a 
proxy would allow us to obtain comparability among our sample firms. In addition, based on 
previous empirical studies, it was noted that most firms which undertake currency hedging 
also undertake other forms of hedging – interest rate or commodity prices as such we would 
expect that by studying foreign exchange risk disclosure would be a good proxy for the risk 
management disclosure as a whole.  
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As such in our study, we build onto the previous model developed by Allayannis and 
Weston (2001) but adding an additional variable to test for the effect of hedging disclosure 
on firm value.  
3.2 Method of defining transparent disclosure  
In order to analyze the transparency of disclosure in annual reports, we proposed a 
framework that covers the important dimensions of what we defined as a transparent 
disclosure. Since the Swedish Stock Exchange follows the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), IFRS was used as a basis to formulate the disclosure standards in order for 
us to assess companies financial reporting. Specifically, we look at the requirements 
highlighted in IFRS 7: Financial Instruments, which governed the requirements concerning 
hedging activities. With this as the base, we defined a set of criteria that a firm has to meet in 
order to fulfill the requirements.  
Additionally, we reviewed best practice reports published by accounting companies such as 
Ernst and Young, Price Waterhouse and Coopers (PWC) and Grant Thornton to obtain 
additional dimensions concerning financial disclosure. Based on the guidelines presented, 
we then developed an additional set of information, which firms could provide, in order to be 
more transparent in their hedging activities.  
3.2.1 IFRS Requirements 
According to IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures), firms are required to classify the 
financial instruments used according to classes of similar instruments and report them in the 
annual report according to two main categories – quantitative and qualitative.  
From a qualitative perspective, firms are required to provide the information about the 
significance of the financial instruments and also the nature and extend of risks that 
consequent from the use of those financial instruments.  Firms are also required to disclose 
additional information about the risk exposure of holding on the different types of financial 
instruments and the objectives and policies the management has for managing those risks. 
In addition, firms are required to provide quantitative description regarding each hedge 
activity, the accounting treatment of the instruments and the nature of the risks that is being 
hedged. The standard requires that firms disclose the accounting treatment of their financial 
instruments (i.e., if they adopted fair value, cash flow hedging or other types of accounting 
method). With respect to market risk and foreign exchange risk, IFRS 7 also compels that 
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firms disclose a sensitivity analysis of the different types of market risk (interest rate, foreign 
exchange risk and other price risks) and how changes in these risks impact the firm.  
3.2.1.1 IFRS Criteria Assessed   
After assessing the requirements from the standard, we came up with 10 key criteria that the 
firm has to fulfill.  
1. Identification of risks that the firm is exposed to 
This information provided should, as mandated by IFRS requirement to be similar to the 
information provided internally to key management.  If the company disclosed some or 
all of the different risks within the annual report, 1 point was given to the firm. 
Otherwise, the firm would obtain a 0. A note of remark however is that, we are just 
looking out for a list of risks that the firm is exposed to and it need not be by any means, 
be all the risks that the firm is exposed to as a qualitative assessment would exceed the 
time-frame and scope of the thesis.  
 
2. Origin of the risks 
If the firm provides some form of explanation as to the areas of their business 
environment that contributes to those risks, 1 point was given to the firm. For example, if 
they have identified foreign exchange risk, they need to give a corresponding explanation 
why are they exposed to this risk (through global sales, etc), otherwise, the firm would 
obtain a 0. 
 
3. Objective of risk management 
This criterion seeks to assess if the firm discloses the objective of its risk management 
activities. 1 point was given if the firm clearly stated its goal for their undertaking of risk 
management activities. For example, 1 point was given when the firm states that their 
objective of managing their foreign exchange risk is to reduce the volatility of their 
earnings. If this information was not found in their annual report, 0 points will be given 
to the firm.  
 
4. Risk management policy  
In order to score a 1, the firm needs to disclose their risk management policy as well as a 
description of their policy. If the firm merely states that a policy is in place without 
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providing additional information (i.e. too general statement), they would be given a 0. 
For example, a 0 is given when the firm states that they have a policy in place and their 
Board reviews this policy annually as this information is too vague and does not 
contribute to a more transparent disclosure.  
 
5. Percentage of exposure being hedged.  
This is important in order for investors to get an understanding what is the level of 
exposure left within the entity as changes in the environment will affect the firm 
according to the exposure left un-hedged. Therefore we would give 1 point to the firm if 
the firm provides us with the percentage of exposure hedged. In this criterion, the 
numerical breakdown was not required as mandated by IFRS 7. For example, if the firm 
states that they hedge between 60-80% of their exposure, this will get them 1 point.  
 
6. Accounting method 
IFRS mandates that the firm provide the information regarding their accounting methods 
used whether it is fair value, cash flow or net investments hedge accounting. This has to 
be stated clearly in order for the firm to receive a 1 otherwise 0 will be given.  
 
7. Effectiveness of hedging   
IFRS mandates that if the firm uses cash flow hedge accounting, it is necessary that the 
firm disclose the effectiveness of their cash flow hedge in their reporting. If this was 
disclosed, 1 point was given to the firm. The regression analysis calculating the 
effectiveness was not required to score a 1, as mandated by IFRS requirements.  
 
8. Type of risk hedged 
 IFRS states that the firm needs to provide some information regarding the nature of the 
risk that is being hedged. In order to score a 1 for this criterion, the company had to 
disclose the type of risk being hedged e.g. transaction or translation.  If this was not 
disclosed, the firm will be given 0.  
 
9. Amount 
Furthermore, a criterion for the amount hedged was assessed in line with the requirement 
from IFRS. In order to score 1 point in this criterion, it was required that the firm 
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publishes the numerical amount that they hedged. If the gross figure of the amount 
hedged is not given, we would award 0 points to the firm.  
 
10. Sensitivity Analysis 
1 point was awarded if the firm provides a sensitivity analysis for its foreign exchange 
risk. For example, we would award 1 point if the firm mentioned that an X% change in 
the Swedish Kroners would impact the Net Income by Y%. If this was not given, 0 
points will be awarded.  
3.2.2 Additional Criteria  
In our methodology, we have also identified additional criteria, which supplement the IFRS 
requirement to measure more transparent disclosure which allows investors to better 
comprehend the foreign exchange risk management activities of the firm. We have based the 
selection of the following criteria according to guidelines advised by major accounting firms. 
In our selection, we have focused on the most critical information that should be disclosed to 
provide investors with an opportunity to assess the complexity and effectiveness of the 
firm’s hedging strategy. We have also balanced the mix of both quantitative and qualitative 
analysis to ensure that the criteria selection is not biased towards a certain type of disclosure. 
We would expect that a good mix of both qualitative and quantitative analysis is necessary to 
cater to the varied types of investors present i.e. those with more financial knowledge might 
prefer quantitative while those with less might prefer more descriptive and qualitative 
analysis of the foreign exchange risk management activities. 
3.2.2.1 Additional criteria assessed 
Upon reviewing various best practices guides published, we came up with 10 additional 
criteria used to assess the firm’s disclosure.  
1. Risk affecting the business 
This criterion requires that the company explain the impact of the risks on their business 
in order to score a 1.  For example, exposure to the foreign exchange risk would result in 
an X% shift in the firm’s net income. In this criterion, we assess if the firm could inform 
investors of the motivation behind their foreign exchange risk management. If this 
information was missing, the firm would be given 0 points in this criterion. 
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2. Numerical breakdown of their foreign exchange exposure  
What we are looking out for in this criterion is if the firm provide a numerical figure for 
each of the major currencies that the firm transacts with indicating the amount of foreign 
exchange risk that they are exposed to. With this information given, the firm will be 
given 1 point, otherwise 0 points for non-disclosure.  
 
3. Duration of the hedge 
If this information regarding the maturity or term of the hedge is provided, 1 point is 
given to the firm. This criterion was chosen based on the best practices guidance from 
big accounting firms, which state that this criterion is useful in order for investors to get 
an understanding of the quality of the hedge (Grant Thornton, 2009). For example, 1 
point is given when the firm states that the exposures are usually hedged for 6-9 months. 
Otherwise, 0 points is given.  
 
4. Type of products used during the hedging process  
Therefore, if the company disclose that they use futures, swaps, forwards or options 1 
point will be given. This criterion is included to provide investors with additional 
information regarding the hedging management so that the investor can better access the 
risk management of the firm. If there is no indication on the type of products used, 0 
points is given to the firm. It is to be noted that this criterion does not aim to assess if the 
firm disclosure all the products used or provide partial information of the products used. 
It is beyond our study to assess if the firm discloses all the products used and this 
criterion aim to test only if the firm provides indication as to some of the types of the 
products used.  
 
5. Breakdown of amount hedged per product 
This criterion allows the investors to understand the hedging activity of the firm. In order 
to obtain 1 point in this criterion, the firm has to provide an analysis that gives a 
breakdown of the amount hedged per product used. For example, the firm has to state 
XXX kroners were hedged using forward contracts and YYY kroners were hedged using 
swaps agreement. If the firm does not provide this information, 0 points will be given.  
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6. Breakdown of positions; i.e. nominal vs.. gross nominal value of the hedge 
Based on best practices guide, it was noted that this information although not mandated 
by IFRS provide investors with a better understanding of the hedge positions. By 
disclosing the breakdown of positions in each currency, the firm will allow investors to 
better understand its hedging activity. In order to score 1 point, the firm needs to disclose 
a numerical breakdown of the gross position in each currency which the firm hedges and 
if this is not provided, 0 points will be given. 
  
7. Numerical figure of the net exposure of risk transfer 
Under this criterion, the firm will score 1 point if they disclose the numerical figure of 
the firm’s net exposure level after taking into account the hedging activities. Consistent 
with the best practice guide, accounting firms argued that this is a follow up from IFRS 
requirements where firm only need to provide the gross amount hedged and not the net 
position. This criterion allow investors to understand the net position of the risk that the 
firm is exposed to and make a better assessment of the firm’s health. If this is not given, 
0 points will be awarded.  
 
8. Effect of hedging activities on financial items. 
If the firm states explicitly in their analysis, which are the relevant financial items, 
affected and what are the effects, the firm will be given 1 point. For example, if the firm 
states that the hedge caused XXX kroners increase in the net profit, 1 point will be given. 
If this information is missing, 0 point will be awarded.  
 
9. Method behind the sensitivity analysis.  
Although not specifically required by IFRS, many accounting firms pointed out that 
firm’s should disclose their assumptions and methods underlying their analysis. In Ernst 
& Young (2007), they indicated that the assumptions and methods underlying the 
analysis are important to reconcile this information with the overall risk exposure of the 
firm. Therefore, in order to score 1 point, the firm needed to explain the method used to 
compute their sensitivity analysis. A point to note however, we do not analyze the 
quality of the method as that is out of the scope of our study.  
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10. Monitoring the effectiveness of its hedging policies 
This is to complement the information regarding the firm’s risk management policy. It 
provides the investor with an understanding if the firm does indeed carry out additional 
actions post-hedging. This is argued to provide investors with the assurance that 
companies do monitor their activities and take necessary actions to deal with any 
discrepancies.  1 point is given to the firm if this information is provided. 
3.2.2.2 Accessibility  
Furthermore, we have also included an additional criterion, which involves the accessibility 
of information within the annual report. This was considered to be important, based on 
earlier studies of transparency (i.e. Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Botosan et al, 2002) which 
have often included accessibility of the information as an important component of disclosure. 
As argued by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), if the reader has to search through many 
narrative pages of reporting in order to find the information he needs, the reader might lose 
appreciation for the information published. They argued that this is akin to searching for a 
“needle in a haystack” where the information is too dispersed and unorganized thus making 
the information communication more difficult to appreciate and comprehend. Logically, the 
more accessible the information, the more valuable the information should be for the 
investors. In order to score 1 point for this criterion, the firm needs to provide the required 
information clearly and link the relevant sections to where the information could be found.  
3.2.3 General remarks regarding method used  
Points were only given for the information provided. Due to scope and timeframe of thesis 
as well as a lack of internal data it was not possible to assess the quality of information 
disclosed by the companies. Therefore, the assumption made in our study is that the 
information provided within the annual reports for the various criteria listed above, would 
represent a reliable image of the firms activities. Furthermore, variances in the quality of the 
financial reporting could be seen throughout different annual reports. However, this 
difference in quality was not taken into account as long as the information discussed was 
provided as this is beyond the scope of our study.  
Following this approach, we hoped that this study is able to assess to a certain extent the 
effectiveness of the IFRS compliance regime in Sweden. Nevertheless, due to the scope of 
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our paper, this is only limited to the IFRS compliance of foreign exchange financial 
instruments and risk reporting. 
3.3 Disclosure model used in this study 
In order to measure the impact of disclosure on firm value, a model for a good disclosure 
firm was outlined through the combinations of the three assessed areas i.e. IFRS component, 
Additional Information component and Accessibility component.  
To measure the impact of IFRS Criteria a threshold of 90 percent was chosen. If the firm 
meets or exceeds this level of disclosure, 1 was given for this component and if the firm 
fulfilled the IFRS requirements to a lower degree, 0 will be awarded. We have established 
the threshold at 90 percent according to our assumption that mandatory IFRS disclosure 
would have to be followed in order to provide a comprehensive overview and to fulfill the 
listing requirements of the Swedish Stock Exchange. Therefore, in order to correctly assess 
the strength of IFRS compliance in Sweden, we chose a strict threshold level.  
The second element for the model was built on the firm’s fulfillment of additional criteria. In 
order to measure the impact of the degree of additional disclosure a threshold of 60 percent 
was chosen. Firms are given a 1 if they meet or exceed the percentage of disclosure and a 0 
otherwise. The threshold was set at a comparable low level in order to include a sufficient 
number of companies within the good disclosure sample. We have picked only the most 
relevant 10 additional criteria, which were advised by major accounting firms to be useful 
for investors. As such, we would like to measure how well do Swedish firms perform in 
providing a detailed account of their hedging activities. In a second step, to separate the most 
transparent firms from the least transparent ones, additional models were tested in order to 
control for significant characteristics. 
The third component, which has to be fulfilled, is the accessibility criterion. For this 
component, the scoring was previously explained in paragraph 3.2.2.2. Firms would obtain 1 
point if the information provided is accessible within the annual report. This component was 
chosen in line with the arguments for its importance in transparency research i.e. Beretta and 
Bolozzan, 2004; Botosan et al, 2002. 
Therefore, in summary, a firm would be deemed as a good disclosure firm if it were able to 
fulfill all 3 components adequately.   
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Good disclosure company 
IFRS criteria Additional criteria Accessibility Number of firms 
90 percent fulfillment 60 percent fulfillment Fulfilled 16 
Table	  1:	  Summary	  of	  model	  used	  in	  this	  study	  
3.4 Data 
Consistent with Botosan (1997), data concerning disclosure is derived from the firms’ annual 
reports as the annual report is deemed the most important disclosure tool used by companies 
to inform investors in detail. Botosan (1997) however found a limited importance of the 
annual report for companies followed by a high number of analysts. Therefore, data 
concerning analyst coverage was retrieved from the news agency Reuters in order to control 
for the effects of analyst coverage on the overall disclosure of the firms. Furthermore, 
secondary data concerning the sample firms’ key figures were obtained through DataStream. 
Considering the time frame of the thesis, surveys as well as interviews to collect additional 
information and opinions on a disclosure level perceived as optimal were disregarded as 
unfeasible, especially considering the fact that a high percentage of companies within the 
sample would have to be approached to generate a significant result. Therefore, research of 
accountancy/consultancy firms was used as a practical complement to scientific research 
papers on the topic of the paper.  
3.5 Sample  
The population researched within this paper consists out of Large, Midcap and Small firms 
listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange at year-end 2009. At this target date 257 firms 
fitting this criteria were listed. The sample was limited to non-financial firms as financial 
firms play a different role within the market considering their business model based on 
financial products and their use of financial instruments are often for different reasons in 
comparison to corporations. This leads to the exclusion of 6 financial institutions. Further 
exclusions were made as a result of missing data in some of the variables required in our 
study (50). We have also excluded non-domestic firms (8) as we would like to measure the 
effect on Swedish firms to ease comparability.  The above-mentioned exclusions were made, 
in order to generate the sample of firms operating under similar conditions.  
 
In addition, 78 companies were identified as non-hedgers, consistent with the research of 
Jankensgård (2011) who performed a keyword check of the annual reports as well as phone 
interviews to identify non-hedgers for his research on centralized and decentralized hedging 
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policies of Swedish firms. The remaining sample of domestic hedging firms listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange finally consists out of 115 companies and the overall sample 
constitutes 193 firms.  
 
 No of Firms 
Total Listed Firms in Swedish Stock Exchange 257 
Financial Firms excluded (6) 
Firms excluded due to missing data (50) 
Foreign Firms excluded (8) 
Total Sample Size  193 
Table	  2:	  Overview	  of	  sample	  used	  
 No of Firms 
Hedgers  115 
Non-hedgers 78 
Table	  3:	  Breakdown	  of	  hedgers	  vs.	  non-­‐hedgers	  in	  sample	  
3.6 Regression Models 
The regression model we use in this study is largely based on the model developed by 
Allayannis and Weston (2001). However, a point to note is that some of the variables used 
are modified in our study to better suit the environment and firms, which we are studying. 
The data used in our regression model consist of a cross-sectional data whereby we study the 
sample over the same time period of 2009.  
We have used Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as the regression method and we ran 2 
different sets of regression in order to test both our hypotheses.  !"#  !"  !"#$!!!  ! =   !"#$%&#% +   !!  !"!!" +   !!   !! +   !       (1) 
In the equation described above, Log of Tobin’s Q is our dependent variable, GDF60 is our 
independent variable and Xi is a set of control variables which will be explained in the 
following section. This regression is used to test our first hypothesis concerning the impact 
of good hedging disclosure on the hedging premium.  !"#  !"  !"#$!!!  ! =   !"#$%&#% +   !!  !"#!!" +   !!  !!!" +   !!   !! +   !        (2) 
In the next regression, our dependent variable remains unchanged but we modified our 
independent variables to be IFRS90 and AD60, which will be explained in the next section. In 
this regression, we have also included the same set of control variables as in the first 
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regression. In this regression, we are testing if additional disclosure is more value adding to 
the firm than IFRS requirements, consistent with our second hypothesis.  
3.7 Variables  
3.7.1 Dependent Variable – Firm Value  
Similar to previous research on the hedging premium, we do proxy firm value using the 
Tobin’s Q ratio. We define Tobin’s Q to be (Total Book Value of Assets – Book Value of 
Equity + Market Value of Assets) /Total Book Value of Assets. According to previous 
empirical research we noted that the Tobin’s Q ratio has a skewed distribution and in order 
to overcome this, we take the natural log of the Tobin’s Q value, which will enable us to 
interpret our results in percentage form.  
3.7.2 Independent Variable – Disclosure Variable  
In the first regression, the variable, which we aim to test for, is the hedging disclosure as 
indicated by our model in Section 3.2. This independent variable takes a form of a dummy 
variable whereby if a firm fulfills the 3 components as stipulated by the dummy, the firm 
will be given a dummy variable of 1 to indicate it is a good disclosure firm. Otherwise, the 
firm is given a 0. In the regression results, this dummy is denoted by the variable Good 
Disclosure Firms (GDF60).  
In our second regression, as mentioned earlier, we have modified the independent variable to 
be IFRS90, a binary dummy that takes the value 1 when the firm meets the 90% threshold for 
IFRS reporting) and AD60, a binary dummy that takes the value 1 when the firm meets 60% 
additional disclosure threshold. This is to assess the difference impact on value created by 
the different components in our model.  
3.7.3 Control Variables  
3.7.3.1 Size  
It has been empirically found that firms, which are larger, tend to engage in derivatives use 
that smaller firms. Additionally, the firm’s value is also affected by size whereby size is 
expected to positively correlate due to higher economies of scale and synergies. On the other 
hand, size correlates negatively with firm’s value whereby the larger the company the harder 
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it is to manage and the less transparent it becomes. Therefore, in order for us to control for 
the size effect from biasing our results, we include a size control variable using a proxy of 
log of Total Sales.  
3.7.3.2 Leverage 
We also expect that the firm’s value is correlated with the amount of leverage in the firm’s 
capital structure. In addition, consistent with transparency literature, we would expect the 
firm’s leverage to affect the level of transparency, as a firm with a higher debt ratio will tend 
to disclose more due to the requirements from creditors. Therefore in order for us to control 
for the differences in the capital structure of the firms within our sample, we included a 
leverage control variable using a proxy of Total Book Value of Debt/ Total Book Value of 
Assets.  
3.7.3.3 Investment Growth  
In Myers (1977), he argued that the firm value is also dependent on the future investment 
opportunities that the firm has. Based on the literature mentioned in the prior section, we 
acknowledge that prior research has given some indication that firms which hedge tend to 
have higher investment opportunities (i.e., one of the strong motivation for hedging). 
Therefore in order for our results to be accurate, we included a variable to control for this. In 
this study, we define Capital Expenditure as additions to Fixed Assets/Total Sales as in 
Jannesgard (2011).  
3.7.3.4 Profitability/ Firm’s Performance  
The profitability level of the firm also affects the firm’s value as we would expect that the 
more profitable the firm is the more the firm tend to trade at a premium (i.e., have a higher Q 
ratio). Therefore to control for profitability, we use the variable Net Income/Total Assets.   
3.7.3.5 Access to financial markets  
Based on previous theoretical framework, we understand that the firm’s ability to undertake 
projects is dependent on the firm’s ability to get financing. If the firm forgoes some projects 
because they are unable to get the financing they need, then we would expect their Q ratio to 
remain high because they will only take on positive NPV projects. Therefore this might bias 
our results and to control for this, we include a dummy control variable, Dividend as done by 
previous studies. Dividend will take the value 1 if the firm pays a dividend. We would also 
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expect a negative relationship between Dummy and the Q ratio because when the firm pays 
dividends, it is less likely to be capital constrained and therefore might have a lower Q value.  
3.7.3.6 Industrial Diversification 
From previous research we acknowledged that there are two groups of arguments regarding 
industrial diversification and the firm value. One set of argument stated that industrial 
diversification increases the firm value while the other set argued that industrial 
diversification is the result of agency problems therefore reducing the firm’s value. In 
general, much empirical evidence indicated a negative relationship between industrial 
diversification and the firm value Therefore in our study, we included a control variable, 
which involves a dummy that takes the value 1 when the firm operates in more than one 
segment.  
3.7.3.7 Industrial Effects 
We would also expect to see that some industrial characteristics might influence the firm’s 
value. For example, firms within an industry that has high Q values will tend to also have a 
higher Q value individually. If these firms are hedgers, then we are unable to tell if these 
firms have a higher Q value because of hedging disclosure or if it was because they belong 
to a high Q industry. Therefore in order to control for this effect, we included a dummy for 
each of the industry according to the Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS).   
3.7.3.8 Corporate Governance  
A firm value is also dependent on the corporate governance and the firm’s internal controls 
mechanisms. We would expect that a firm with stronger internal control mechanisms would 
use their resources more efficiently. In addition, we would also expect that a firm with 
stronger corporate governance will tend to be more transparent in their reporting. Therefore, 
in order to control for this effect on the firm value, we use 3 additional variables. Firstly, the 
variable Block Ownership is used to account for the strength of the internal controls. A firm 
with larger block ownership tends to have a stronger internal control mechanism. The 
variable Block Ownership is defined as the number of shares owned by non-managerial 
block-holders/ total number of shares and these block-holders are those shareholders who 
own more than 10% of the firm’s number of shares. We also use an additional variable 
Management Shares as defined by the total number of shares held by the CEO and CFO/total 
number of shares to account for the degree of alignment between management and the firm’s 
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stockholders.  Finally, we have included the variable Institutional Investors to control for the 
institutional ownership in the firm ownership structure. Previous empirical studies such as 
Charleton et al (1998) and Fernando et al (2007) found that a higher degree of institutional 
investors results in a higher monitoring for the firm. This is also consistent with the 
theoretical argument that a higher level of institutional investors also results in a higher firm 
value.  
3.7.3.9 Geographical Diversification 
It has long been argued that geographical diversification results in an increase in the firm’s 
value. Firms, which are able to tap on external markets out of its home market, is said to be 
able to increase sales and capture more customers. The more geographically diversified a 
firm is, the more the firm is able to reduce the volatility of its earnings and increase the 
stability of its cash flows. Therefore, this should increase the value of the firm. As such, we 
would need to include a control variable to control for the effect of geographical 
diversification on the firm’s value, to do this we would use the ratio foreign sales/ total sales 
to proxy for this variable.  
3.7.3.10 Number of Analysts following firm  
Investors obtain information from a myriad of sources other than the firm’s annual report. 
Therefore, we included an additional control variable number of analysts following firm to 
control for the possibility that investors do not react to the information listed in the annual 
report but rather from additional sources such as analyst reports. We have included this in 
both regressions. We argue that firms with more analyst coverage tend to be more well 
known therefore might obtain a higher Q value. It is also important to control for this 
because we would like to only test the impact of the firm’s additional disclosure through the 
annual report on the firm’s value and thus we have to isolate the effect of analyst coverage. 
By including this additional control variable, we will also be able to measure what is within 
scope of this paper and exclude the effect of overall reduction in information asymmetry and 
the effect on firm’s value.  
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 Regression 1 Regression 2 
Dependent Variable  Log of Tobin’s Q  Log of Tobin’s Q 
Independent Variable Good Disclosure IFRS90 
AD60 
Control Variables Industry Effects  
Access to Capital Markets 
Leverage 
Industrial Diversification 
Geographical Diversification 
Investment  
Profitability  
Size  
Corporate Governance  
No of Analysts following  
Institutional Investors  
Industry Effects  
Access to Capital Markets 
Leverage 
Industrial Diversification 
Geographical Diversification 
Investment  
Profitability  
Size  
Corporate Governance  
No of Analysts following  
Institutional Investors 
Table	  4:	  Summary	  of	  regression	  variables	  
3.8 Comments regarding the regression model used  
Since we are using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, we have to control for 
the assumptions governing the reliability of this method. Therefore, in this study, we have 
controlled for autocorrelation, heterokedasticity, normality and model specification errors. In 
order to control for autocorrelation, we have relied on the widely used Durbin-Watson test 
statistic to check for the presence of any autocorrelation in our series. The results indicated 
negative and our sample is free from any autocorrelation issues. Also, we have checked our 
sample for any presence of heterokedasticity. Heterokedasticity was present in our sample; 
as such we have used the White’s robust standard errors to control for this issue. With 
regards to the issue on normality, we tested for Jarque-Bera statistic and found that our 
model did not meet the normality requirement. However, in line with statistical framework, 
since our sample is large enough (193 firms), the violation of normality is negligible and we 
could apply the central limit theorem (CLT) to assume for normality in sample. Lastly, we 
also controlled for the presence of multi-collinearity. None of the variables indicate a 
positive collinear relationship therefore we could argue that our regression is a stable model. 
We have also ran a Ramsey RESET test to check if the parameters used in our study is linear 
and the results showed no indication of a non-linearity present. Therefore, we assume with 
high reliability that the function is correctly specified for our regression model.  
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3.9 Validity and Reliability of Method 
3.9.1 Reliability  
The reliability issue concerning this study involves 2 different dimensions – the reliability of 
our data and the reliability of our method used in coding the criteria. We have ensured that 
the data used in this study was reliable as they were extracted from reliable sources such as 
DataStream, Reuters and annual reports. The process of excluding certain firms from our 
sample was also described thoroughly without any bias and randomness. As such our final 
sample can be deemed to be reliable. In addition, we have also ensured that our coding 
method was highly reliable as we have 2 different researchers analyzing each firm’s annual 
report to ensure consistency in the coding process. During the process of coding, we have 
also come up with a set of standards to guide the coding process. These are done to ensure 
consistency and a higher degree of reliability of the method used. Finally, the OLS was also 
done through Eviews to ensure an optimal accuracy in terms of the calculation methods. 
Therefore, both our data and method used have been checked to ensure that a high degree of 
reliability was maintained.  
3.9.2 Validity  
The methodology used in this method was largely based on the model used by many other 
studies (such as Allayannis and Weston, 2001). Therefore while studying this topic, the 
method is assumed to be applicable. We have also crosschecked the use of control variables 
in this paper with previous studies done on this topic and found that the variables used are 
valid. In addition, the methodology process of coding the various criteria is also consistent 
with previous studies on transparency.  Therefore, we have ensured that the method and 
process are highly valid in this study. However, a point to note is that since this study is the 
first of its kind – studying the relationship between disclosure and firm’s value, there is no 
ability for us to compare or benchmark our results against any other studies. Also, the 
control variable – corporate governance might not be consistent across all countries due to 
the different corporate governance system adopted by different nations. Therefore, this might 
lead to our results not being that useful in certain contexts.  
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4  Empirical Findings 
In	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   section,	   we	   present	   various	   descriptive	   statistics	   for	   our	  
sample.	   In	   the	  next	  part	  of	   this	   section,	  we	  present	   to	  you	  the	  empirical	   findings	   from	  
our	  coding	  study	  of	  the	  firm’s	  annual	  report.	  Finally,	   in	  the	  last	  part	  of	  this	  section	  we	  
will 	  describe	  the	  regression	  results .	  	  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The total sample consists out of 193 firms listed at the Swedish stock exchange. First we 
present the total sample and then a comparison between hedgers and non-hedgers as well as 
breakdown for good and bad disclosure firms. Roughly 60 percent of the companies within 
the sample are classified as hedgers. In a third step we further broke down the hedgers into 
good and bad disclosure firms as defined by our model in Section 3.3.    
The descriptive statistics for our total sample showed that companies within the sample 
differ significantly in their characteristics. This for example, can be seen in factors such as 
foreign sales ranging from 0 to 100 percent as well as in a level of institutional investors 
ranging from 0 to 91 percent.  This indicates a difference in the geographical diversity and 
ownership structure of the firms within our sample. In addition, we also noted the difference 
in the number of analyst following the firm indicating differences in size and popularity 
among the firms in our sample.  
 Total Sample n=193 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
TOBINSQLOG 0.365 0.227 2.608 -0.659 0.577 
HEDGER 0.596 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.492 
DIV 0.632 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.483 
IND 0.544 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.499 
LEVERAGE 0.209 0.178 0.743 0.000 0.186 
CAPEX 0.030 0.019 0.195 0.000 0.034 
SIZE 6.381 6.228 8.505 4.484 0.866 
FOREIGN 51.899 55.020 100.000 0.000 32.967 
MGMTSHARES 0.035 0.002 0.853 0.000 0.100 
ROA -0.013 0.032 0.468 -1.558 0.233 
BLOCKOWNERSHIP 26.954 22.400 141.100 0.000 22.606 
ANALYST 7.062 4.000 43.000 0.000 8.671 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.325 0.301 0.913 0.000 0.209 
DECENTRALIZED 0.145 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.353 
Table	  5:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  complete	  sample	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Separating our sample into Hedgers and non-Hedgers, it can be seen from the comparison of 
the descriptive statistics between the two samples, that the mean of Tobins Q is higher for 
Hedgers than non-Hedgers. This is in line with the findings of Allayannis and Weston (2001) 
in the US market but surprisingly different from the results of Pramborg (2004), which 
found a higher value for non-hedgers within a sample of the Swedish market. Another, 
expected observation is the higher exposure to foreign exchange risk of hedgers shown by 
the higher percentage of foreign sales made by firms within the Hedger sample. This aligns 
our findings with theoretical expectations that a firm exposed to a higher level of risk would 
have a greater motivation to hedge that risk. Another interesting observation made in this 
comparison is the number of Analyst following. The mean is higher for Hedger than for non-
Hedger. This could be due to the larger size of hedging firms, as more Analysts tend to 
follow firms of international significance and generating comparably higher revenues. This 
is consistent with the findings in literature that size is also a factor concerning the use of 
derivatives, as larger firms tend to have access to a higher level of resources and expertise. 
Hedging firms also tend to have a higher percentage of dividends paying firms, which is a 
proxy for access to additional resources. Once again, we find that this result could be 
explained by the larger firm size within the hedging sample therefore, they are more likely to 
have additional resources for internal operations and dividend payments.  
 Hedger n=115 Non Hedger n=78 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
TOBINSQLOG 0.366 0.303 0.491 0.363 0.111 0.689 
DIV 0.678 1.000 0.469 0.564 1.000 0.499 
IND 0.635 1.000 0.484 0.410 0.000 0.495 
LEVERAGE 0.214 0.213 0.164 0.203 0.134 0.217 
CAPEX 0.032 0.023 0.033 0.026 0.011 0.036 
SIZE 6.589 6.515 0.831 6.074 5.931 0.829 
FOREIGN 62.138 65.770 28.027 36.803 34.565 34.052 
MGMTSHARES 0.027 0.001 0.101 0.046 0.005 0.099 
ROA 0.012 0.035 0.163 -0.051 0.020 0.306 
BLOCKOWNERSHIP 26.997 22.400 20.513 26.892 22.750 25.520 
ANALYST 9.174 5.000 10.140 3.949 2.000 4.330 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.350 0.338 0.214 0.289 0.270 0.198 
DECENTRALIZED 0.243 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table	  6:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  hedger	  vs.	  non-­‐hedger 
Within the Hedger group we have also isolated good disclosure from bad disclosure firms. 
Generally, we find that good disclosure firms have a lower value and are more diversified 
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and have a lower percentage of block ownership. This could indicate that there is a valuation 
discount potentially for non-related diversification. The comparable lower value in spite of a 
higher return on assets and more dividends paid could be seen as an indication for a higher 
level of information asymmetry. Therefore, transparent disclosure becomes more important 
for the firm to attract investors.  This, observations strengthen when only companies (n=5) 
fulfilling 90 percent of the additional disclosure are observed. Companies with this highest 
level of disclosure are furthermore covered by fewer analysts and tend towards a 
decentralized hedging policy showing a mean of 0.4 for good disclosure compared to 0.236 
for the rest of the sample. A finding that is only marginal for good disclosure companies 
found within our model was the mean for number of Analysts following, which is not 
significantly different. However, the median shows less variance within the number of 
Analyst following, indicating a common characteristic for good disclosure firms.  
 Good Disclosure n=16 Bad Disclosure n=99 
 Mean Median Std.  
Dev. 
Mean Median Std. 
Dev. 
TOBINSQLOG 0.257 0.296 0.248 0.384 0.303 0.518 
DIV 0.813 1.000 0.403 0.657 1.000 0.477 
IND 0.625 1.000 0.500 0.636 1.000 0.483 
LEVERAGE 0.233 0.281 0.130 0.211 0.200 0.169 
CAPEX 0.031 0.030 0.015 0.032 0.022 0.035 
SIZE 6.805 6.884 0.739 6.554 6.415 0.843 
FOREIGN 61.423 62.770 24.057 62.254 67.880 28.724 
MGMTSHARES 0.018 0.002 0.045 0.028 0.001 0.107 
ROA 0.021 0.035 0.062 0.011 0.036 0.174 
BLOCKOWNERSHIP 18.619 16.950 14.341 28.351 24.000 21.087 
ANALYST 10.125 10.000 8.032 9.020 5.000 10.468 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.297 0.298 0.216 0.359 0.339 0.213 
DECENTRALIZED 0.250 - 0.447 0.242 - 0.431 
Table	  7:	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  for	  good	  vs.	  bad	  disclosure	  firms 
4.2 Empirical results from data collection  
A sample of 115 hedging firms listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange was assessed for their 
level of compliance with a number of criteria on IFRS and additional disclosure. A detailed 
description can be found in section 3.2.  
We present in this section, the outcome of our coding method. The results show that a 
majority of companies fulfill a high percentage of the IFRS criteria while the additional 
information criteria are fulfilled to a lesser extent, i.e. an Average of 73 percent for IFRS 
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criteria and an average of 44 percent for additional criteria were found to be fulfilled. We 
observed that more complex and sensitive criteria were disclosed to a lesser degree as 
discussed in more detail in the following section. The presentation of the disclosed 
information was rated accessible for 97 out of the 115 firms in accordance with the 
definition of accessibility discussed in section 3.2. 
4.2.1 IFRS reporting Component 
For IFRS component of disclosure, the trend within the sample indicates a tendency towards 
less detailed and more general disclosure can be seen in the very low level of disclosing 
information concerning the “Effectiveness of hedging”. Firms are also less inclined to 
provide information that is more numerical in nature or those that involves detailed internal 
information. This can be seen in the weaker performance around criteria such as “Percentage 
of exposure being hedged” and “Risk management policy”.  
The table below shows the number of companies fulfilling each IFRS criterion and the 
percentage of the sample they represent.  
IFRS Criteria 
Criteria Number of 
companies 
Percentage 
of sample 
Identification of risks that the firm is exposed to 115 100 
Origin of the risks 113 98 
Objective of risk management 87 76 
Risk management policy  67 58 
Percentage of exposure being hedged 68 59 
Accounting method 107 93 
Effectiveness of hedging 16 14 
Type of risk hedged 108 94 
Amount 78 68 
Sensitivity Analysis 81 70 
Table	  8:	  Fulfillment	  of	  IFRS	  Criteria 
Out of the sample of 115 companies, 25 companies fulfilled 90 percent of the IFRS criteria 
contributing to approximately 22 percent of the firms in the sample. Lowering the 
percentage to 80 percent, this increases the number of companies meeting the required 
threshold to 52 contributing to approximately 45 percent of the sample. From our analysis, 
we found only one company disclosing less than 40 percent of IFRS requirements.  The 
distribution within the sample is shown in Table 9.  
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IFRS Criteria   
Percentage of Fulfillment Number of firms Number of firms (combined) 
90 25 25 
80 27 52 
70 30 82 
60 20 102 
50 11 113 
40 1 114 
30 1 115 
Table	  9:	  Fulfillment	  of	  IFRS	  Criteria,	  number	  of	  firms 
4.2.2 Additional Disclosure Component 
The observation above that the firms tend to prefer disclosing less detailed and less sensitive 
criteria of the IFRS reporting is further strengthened by our findings that firms in our sample 
generally do not disclose additional information beyond IFRS in their annual reports. Within 
this component, firms generally perform badly with large deviations in the fulfillment of 
individual criteria assessed.  
Furthermore, in line with this observation, the highest percentage of fulfillment was found 
for the criteria “Type of products used during the hedging process” with 90 percent of the 
sample providing this information while the “Breakdown of amount hedged per product” is 
disclosed by only 30 percent of the firms. Consistent with findings concerning IFRS Criteria, 
the lowest percentage is observed for “Monitoring the effectiveness of its hedging policies” 
with 7 percent, followed by 26 percent fulfillment of “Numerical figure of the net exposure 
of risk transfer”. The following table shows the fulfillment level for each of the criteria 
defined for the measurement of additional disclosure. 
Additional Criteria 
Criteria Number of 
companies 
Percentage 
of sample 
Risk affecting the business 80 70 
Numerical breakdown of their foreign exchange exposure 74 64 
Duration of the hedge 58 50 
Type of products used during the hedging process  90 78 
Breakdown of amount hedged per product 35 30 
Breakdown of positions; i.e. nominal vs.. gross nominal value 
of the hedge 
49 43 
Numerical figure of the net exposure of risk transfer 30 26 
Effect of hedging activities on financial items 44 38 
Method behind the sensitivity analysis 37 32 
Monitoring the effectiveness of its hedging policies 8 7 
Table	  10:	  Fulfillment	  of	  Additional	  Criteria 
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Table 11 below shows the distribution of additional disclosure within the sample 
supplementing the observation of a trend towards a low level of disclosure for the firms in 
the sample. The majority of the firms within our sample were seen to fulfill approximately 
20-60% of voluntary disclosure.  
Additional criteria   
Percentage of Fulfillment Number of firms Number of firms (cumulative) 
90 5 5 
80 6 11 
70 6 17 
60 17 34 
50 19 53 
40 21 74 
30 18 92 
20 14 106 
10 7 113 
Table	  11:	  Summary	  for	  additional	  criteria	  fulfillment 
4.3 Correlation of variables used in regression 
In this segment we would like to present the correlation among all the variables with our 
Disclosure variable and observe the results. Interestingly, we found in our test that hedging 
disclosure does not result in a higher firm value, in fact, the findings seems to suggest that 
the more the firm disclose its hedging activities, Q value is negatively impacted by 
approximately 5.63% and this result is also statistically insignificant. In addition, we 
observed that there is a negative correlation between corporate governance mechanisms 
(denoted by MgmtShares, BlockOwnership and Institutional) and the disclosure pattern of 
the firm. The findings seems to indicate that as corporate governance mechanisms increases, 
the disclosure level decreases. The summary for the correlation analysis can be found in 
Table 12 below.  
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Correlation Matrix 
  
GDF_60  
-0.0563 TOBINSQLOG 
0.2476 Hedger 
0.1125 Div 
0.0489 Ind 
0.0378 Leverage 
0.0121 Capex 
0.1477 Size 
0.0871 Foreign 
-0.0485 MgmtShares 
0.0443 ROA 
-0.1112 BlockOwnership 
0.1065 Analyst 
-0.0415 Institutional 
0.0896 Decentralized 
1.0000 GDF_60 
Table	  12:	  Correlation	  matrix 
From this result, we could conclude that despite the negative correlation between firm’s 
value and the disclosure variable, this does not indicate that there is no hedging disclosure 
premium as there could be other factors that could affect the covariance between the two 
variables. As such, this provides an indication that we would have to control for other 
additional factors to correctly estimate the presence of a hedging disclosure premium. 
4.4 Multivariate Regression Results  
In this section, we present the results from the OLS regression with the dependent variable 
being log of Tobin’s Q. In order for us to evaluate the effect of hedging disclosure on the 
firm’s value, we have to include all the control variables that could affect the firm’s Q values 
as described in Section 3.6.  
In addition to those control variables, we have also controlled for an additional dummy, Bad 
Disclosure Firms (BDF), which takes a value 1 if the firm is a hedging firm with bad 
disclosure practices. By doing this, we are able to test for the marginal effect of good 
disclosure on the hedging premium since the BDF variable controls for all hedging firms 
without good disclosure (ie, this measures the hedging premium in general). By default, the 
variable Good Disclosure Firms (GDF) will then take the value 1 if the firm is a hedging 
firm with good disclosure practices. As such, the co-efficient obtained will enable us to 
observe the marginal effect that good disclosure has on the hedging premium as the 
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differences between GDF and BDF indicates the premium given for good hedging disclosure 
practices. The result from our base model is presented below in Table 13. For a full review 
of our regression including industry dummies, please refer to Appendix A.2 
 
Multivariate Regression Results 
Dependent variable: TOBINSQLOG 
 
  Coefficient t-ratio  
const 1.803 5.48 *** 
Div 0.082 1.58  
Ind -0.065 -1.30  
Leverage -0.253 -1.72 * 
Capex 0.997 1.48  
Size -0.315 -6.86 *** 
Foreign 0.002 2.43 ** 
MgmtShares -0.167 -0.82  
ROA 0.292 1.20  
BlockOwnership -0.000 -0.06  
Analyst 0.023 4.62 *** 
Institutional -0.027 -0.26  
GDF_60 0.120 1.59  
BDF_60 0.079 1.34  
    
R-squared 0.434   
Adj R-squared 0.364   
Table	  13:	  Multivariate	  Regression	  Results3	  
Based on this result, we note that our model of a good disclosure firm is positively related to 
firm’s value, however this result is statistically insignificant. A firm, which practice good 
risk management disclosure, yields an approximate 12.0% increase in its firm value 
compared to only a 7.9% hedging premium for a firm that does not practice good disclosure. 
This finding suggests that good hedging disclosure could potentially increase the hedging 
premium by 4.10% (the difference between the premium obtained by GDF and BDF). This 
finding provides some indication for our hypothesis and suggests that hedging disclosure 
impacts the hedging premium on firm’s value. This premium might on first glance seem high. 
However, it is to note that the foreign exchange disclosure is a proxy for overall risk 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We have also acknowledge that while carrying out this regression, there might be a potential endogenity issue, 
consistent with prior studies where there is a loop effect in the causality between our control variable, hedger and 
dependent variable, Tobin’s Q. We have tried to overcome this problem through the Two-staged least squared 
regression but this results in a statistical loss of many observations and weak results. We argue that the endogeneity 
is not contemporaneous hence the results obtained through OLS method above are still consistent and valid. 
3 In the regression table, *** denotes significance level of 99%, ** denotes significance level of 95% and * denotes 
significance level of 90%.  
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management disclosure. It is assumed that a firm, which discloses a high level of foreign 
exchange disclosure, will also do the same for its other risk exposures such as interest rates 
and commodity prices. The adjusted R-squared is however lower in comparison to 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) but in line with the findings from Pramborg (2004) in his 
studies of Swedish firms.  
Looking at other explanatory variables, we note that the result also indicates that there is a 
hedging premium (denoted by the variable BDF) by about 7.90% on firm’s value, consistent 
with other previous studies. This finding is smaller than the findings from Pramborg (2004) 
which indicated a premium of 13.8% and lower than the findings of Allayannis and Weston 
(2001) which found a premium of 4.87% in the US market. We argue that the premium we 
obtained of 7.90% is not surprising considering the deviations obtained in other hedging 
premium studies. The difference in the premium we found could be attributed to the foreign 
exchange fluctuations in 2009, which increases the foreign currency risk faced by the firm. 
We therefore conclude, that based on the hedging premium found in our study, it is well in 
range with other studies and fits logically with the high exporting and open Swedish 
economy.  
In addition, consistent with the findings from other studies, we also found that size and 
geographical diversification (denoted by the variable “Foreign”) was statistically significant 
at 99% and 95% respectively while the variable “Leverage” was found to be statistically 
significant at 90%. We have included an additional variable – “Analyst” and found this to be 
statistically significant at 99%. We provide some explanation for this finding in the next 
section of this paper. With regards to the strength of statistical significance for other 
variables, we argue that since we are using a sample from all firm’s available which meets 
our criteria, we have thus inevitably relaxed the requirements of statistical significance, 
which states that this is important in making inferences from a sample of a small size.  
We have also checked for the results when the “Analyst” variable was removed to analyze 
the effect on our findings without this control variable. We found the following set of result 
as shown in Table 14 with this additional restriction.  
We observed that the good disclosure firms’ variable indicates a premium of 16.3% and this 
is statistically significant at 95% while the bad disclosure firms’ variable which indicates the 
general hedging premium without disclosure, indicates a premium of 16.9% and this is 
statistically significant at 99%. This indicates that good hedging disclosure does not 
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contribute to the hedging premium without the “Analyst” variable and the discount is 
approximately 0.06%.  
Observing other explanatory variables, we observe that size and geographical diversification 
are still statistically significant at 99% and 95% respectively. Management shares and block 
ownership measuring strength in corporate governance on the other hand are found to be 
statistically significant at 99% and 95% respectively. Based on this result, we obtained an 
indication that the number of analysts following the firm co-interacts with the disclosure 
level of the firm and well as impact the value of the firm and the removal of this variable 
will lead to an omitted variable bias distorting our results. We have also provided some 
explanation for this finding in the next section of this paper.  
Multivariate Regression without Analyst 
Dependent variable: TOBINSQLOG 
 
  Coefficient t-ratio  
const 1.184 4.49 *** 
Div 0.087 1.59  
Ind -0.011 -0.22  
Leverage -0.010 -0.07  
Capex 0.913 1.11  
Size -0.170 -4.57 *** 
Foreign 0.002 2.52 ** 
MgmtShares -0.402 -3.24 *** 
ROA 0.070 0.28  
BlockOwnership -0.002 -1.91 * 
Institutional 0.143 1.11  
GDF_60 0.163 2.08 ** 
BDF_60 0.169 3.01 *** 
    
R-squared 0.622   
Adj R-squared 0.578   
Table	  14:	  Multivariate	  Regression	  without	  Analyst	  
4.5 Robustness of model 
In this section, we explore the robustness of our model by changing the components of our 
model – namely the IFRS threshold and the additional disclosure threshold. We have chosen 
to fix the accessibility component as we argue that accessibility should be the bare minimum 
the firm should aim for in order to achieve an effective risk communication with the reader. 
This is also consistent Beretta and Bolozzan (2004), who argue that inaccessible information 
is treated less valuably by investors in comparison to more accessible information.  
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Specifically, in our robustness tests we looked at 7 other scenarios as listed below and 
observe the results to check if these results fit with our model.  
Dummy IFRS Criteria Additional Criteria Accessibility Number of 
Firms 
90/70 90% fulfillment 70% fulfillment Accessible 12 
90/80 90% fulfillment 80% fulfillment Accessible 9 
90/90 90% fulfillment 90% fulfillment Accessible 5 
80/60 80% fulfillment 60% fulfillment Accessible 32 
80/70 80% fulfillment 70% fulfillment Accessible 16 
80/80 80% fulfillment 80% fulfillment Accessible 10 
80/90 80% fulfillment 90% fulfillment Accessible 5 
Table	  15:	  Models	  tested	  for	  robustness 
By running addition tests to check for the results, we found that our model is consistent with 
our hypothesis – the more the firm discloses the more value-adding it is and the higher the 
Tobin’s Q value. We present the results of our robustness test in Table 16 and 17. For a full 
overview of our regression table, please refer to Appendix B. 
Dummy 90/90 90/80  90/70 90/60 
Good Disclosure Firms (GDF) 0.137 0.148 0.074 0.120 
Bad Disclosure Firms (BDF) 0.070 0.073 0.084 0.079 
Premium (Difference) 0.067 0.075 -0.010 0.041 
Table	  16:	  Robustness	  Comparative	  Results	  at	  IFRS	  90%	  threshold	  
Dummy 80/90 80/80 80/70 80/60 
Good Disclosure Firms (GDF) 0.137 0.144 0.024 0.072 
Bad Disclosure Firms (BDF) 0.070 0.075 0.082 0.077 
Premium (Difference) 0.067 0.069 -0.058 -0.005 
Table	  17:	  Robustness	  Comparative	  Results	  at	  IFRS	  80%	  threshold	  
 
Based on the results above, we note that the effects by changing from 90% IFRS reporting 
threshold to 80%, the impact of good hedging disclosure on the hedging premium (denoted 
by the difference in the co-efficient of GDF and BDF) is smaller. In addition, when we 
observe the trend of the premium as we vary the threshold level for the additional disclosure 
component (i.e. increasing it step-wise from 60% to 90%), a dip can be seen at 70% and the 
effect was the strongest at 80%.  This effect remains the same when we changed the IFRS 
reporting threshold from 90% to 80%. These two observations indicate that there are 
component specific factors (specifically the relevance of IFRS reporting and additional 
disclosure) coming into play that could affect the size of the premium.  
However, in general, we found that our model is robust to changes in our variables and 
therefore reliable predicting the effects of firm’s hedging disclosure and the impact on firm’s 
	   53	  
value. There is a positive relationship of a hedging disclosure premium on the firm’s value at 
higher level of disclosure and this is consistent at both IFRS reporting threshold of 90% and 
80%. The findings are generally consistent with our hypothesis.  
In our robustness tests, we have also run the regression with and without “Analyst” control 
to check for the reliability of our results. Through these tests we found that without the 
inclusion of the “Analyst” variable, the results do indicate consistent findings we present the 
robustness check in Table 18. For full overview of our robustness test regression, please 
refer to Appendix C & D.  
Dummy 90/90 90/80 90/70 90/60 
Good Disclosure 0.090 0.111 0.111 0.163 
Bad Disclosure 0.155 0.164 0.184 0.169 
Premium (Difference) -0.065 -0.053 -0.073 -0.006 
Table	  18:	  Robustness	  check	  with	  the	  exclusion	  of	  Analyst	  variable	  for	  IFRS	  90%	  threshold	  
Based on the results indicated above, we note that without “Analyst” control, disclosure 
impacts the firm’s value negatively. This allows us to explore some explanation of why this 
might be the case and we will present this in our analysis section of this paper.  
In all the robustness check analysis that we carried out, we noted that the signs for the other 
control variables remain the same and the statistical significant of some of the variables 
remains unchanged. For example, when “Analyst” variable is included, size, leverage, 
geographical diversification and analyst remains as the most statistically significant variable 
in all our regressions. However, when “Analyst” is removed, size, foreign, block ownership 
and management shares became the most statistically significant variables consistent across 
all the regression models. In addition, for all the regressions ran, we also found that industry 
dummies which provide us with the indication that the industry where the firms belong to 
matters. Therefore, the robustness checks have allowed us to assume with greater certainty 
that our findings suggest a good disclosure increases the hedging premium by approximately 
4.10% among Swedish firms.  
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4.6 Component Specific Analysis  
In addition to the robustness testing, we broke down our model to look at the separate effects 
of IFRS reporting and Additional disclosure on the firm’s value4. This is in line with our 
second hypothesis where we aim to test if investors attach more value to additional 
disclosure than IFRS reporting.  
When we ran this test on our base model, we found the following set of result shown in 
Table 19 below. The results indicate that Additional Disclosure as denoted by AD_60 
variable, results in a positive effect on firm’s value by 0.09% while IFRS reporting as 
denoted by IFRS_90 variable results in a positive effect of 3.00%. This finding is of interest 
to as it provides some indication that the effect of IFRS reporting is stronger than additional 
disclosure, inconsistent with what we expected. This result indicates a rejection for our 
second hypothesis and suggests that Additional Disclosure does not result in a higher 
premium in comparison to IFRS compliance.  
Once again, we found that size and analyst are statistically significant at 99% while 
geographical diversification is statistically significant at 95%, consistent with our results 
presented earlier in this section. An interesting point to note, the variable “Capex” which 
represents investment growth opportunities also becomes statistically significant at 90% in 
this regression. When we remove the “Analyst” variable and run this regression again, the 
results was also consistent with earlier findings, the effect of IFRS reporting was positive but 
additional disclosure was negative. This indicates with more certainty the effect that analyst 
plays in the hedging disclosure premium.  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  In this regression, we have also controlled for two additional variables, Hedgers, a binary dummy that takes the value 1 if 
the firm hedges and 0 otherwise; and Decentralized, another binary dummy that takes the value 1 if the firm has a 
decentralized risk management policy and 0 otherwise. We argue that Hedger variable is important to control for the 
hedging premium effect and thus isolate that effect from what we would like to see, hedging disclosure impact on firm’s 
value. In addition, Decentralized was included to isolate the effect of hedging policy (either to take on a centralized 
approach or a decentralized approach) on the possible effect on firm’s disclosure practices.   
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  Component Specific Regression 
Dependent variable: TOBINSQLOG 
  Coefficient t-ratio  
const 1.818 4.97 *** 
Hedger 0.068 1.05  
Div 0.056 0.98  
Ind -0.066 -1.27  
Leverage -0.208 -1.40  
Capex 1.047 1.71 * 
Size -0.323 -6.22 *** 
Foreign 0.002 2.18 ** 
MgmtShares -0.239 -0.98  
ROA 0.382 1.54  
BlockOwnership 0.000 0.30  
Analyst 0.0245 4.55 *** 
Institutional -0.000 -0.00  
Decentralized -0.002 -0.04  
IFRS_90 0.030 0.47  
AD_60 0.009 0.15  
    
R-squared 0.434   
Adj R-squared 0.358   
Table	  19:	  Component	  Specific	  Regression	  
We have also checked for the robustness of this model by changing the threshold of 
additional disclosure and found the results to be consistent with earlier findings. Additional 
disclosure is indicative to result in higher premium at 80% and 90% threshold otherwise the 
premium is small or negative. The robustness test for this model is shown below in Table 20 
and 21. For a complete regression analysis, please refer to appendix E-F. We have also 
provided some form of analysis for this finding in the next section.  
With Analyst 90% 80% 70% 60% 
IFRS @ 90% 0.035 0.048 0.090 0.030 
Additional Disclosure 0.068 0.066 -0.066 0.009 
Table	  20:	  Comparative	  Robustness	  Results	  with	  Analyst	  Control	  
Without Analyst 90% 80% 70% 60% 
IFRS @ 90% 0.049 0.037 0.086 0.028 
Additional Disclosure -0.070 -0.065 -0.147 -0.033 
Table	  21:	  Comparative	  Robustness	  Results	  without	  Analyst	  Control	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5  Analysis and discussions 
In	   this	   section	   we	   provide	   some	   analysis	   and	   discussions	   for	   the	   results	   obtained	   in	  
the	  previous	  section.	  	  
5.1 Hedging Disclosure and its effect on Hedging Premium  
In our correlation variable and univariate test, we found that hedging disclosure does not 
result in a premium on firm’s value. The result from the correlation study indicates a 
coefficient of -0.0568, suggesting a negative relationship between disclosure and the firm’s 
value. However, we have to stress that this result does not take into account other control 
variables that might affect the relationship between firm’s disclosure and firm’s value. 
Therefore, it is important to include other control variables to isolate the effects of hedging 
on the firm’s value. As such, we argue that the result from our multivariate regression is 
more reasonable and reliable to observe the effect of hedging disclosure on the firm’s value.  
In our multivariate regression, we included most of the controls that were consistent with 
previous empirical studies concerning the hedging premium. Our findings indicated that for 
our base model, good hedging disclosure does positively impact the hedging premium and 
this impact is suggested to be at 4.10%. However, we included additional variables that 
could have an effect on the firm value – no of analyst following the firm and the percentage 
of institutional holdings in the company. Consistent with the literature, both these additional 
variables might impact the effect of the hedging disclosure variable (independent variable) 
on the firm’s value (dependent variable) as such, we have to control for the effect that these 
variables might cause in order to correctly isolate the effect of hedging disclosure on firm’s 
value.  
5.2 Control Variables  
5.2.1 Institutional Investors  
In our tests, we have included an additional variable to proxy for corporate governance – 
percentage of institutional investors in ownership structure. This variable was not used in 
other previous studies. However, we argued that the more institutional investors there are in 
the ownership structure the more valuable the firm might be. This is consistent with some 
empirical studies, which indicated that the higher the level of institutional investors in the 
firm’s ownership structure, the higher the firm’s Q value would be. As mentioned before, 
institutional investors allow for better monitoring in the firm through higher governance 
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mechanism (Carleton et al, 1998). Therefore, we include this variable as an additional 
control to isolate this effect of institutional holdings on firm’s value.  
In addition, consistent with previous studies on transparency, we note that institutional 
investors might also impact the level of disclosure within the firm. Research on this topic has 
been divided to a certain extent. Some researchers such as Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and 
Carleton et al (1998) found that the more institutional investors there are, the more a firm 
would disclose consistent with the corporate governance theoretical framework which states 
that more institutional investors allow for better monitoring and higher transparency. 
However, other research as Sias et al (2001) and Bushee and Goodman (2007) found that 
institutional investors take advantage of short-term momentum whereby these investors 
prefer lesser information so that they could leverage on their internal information to profit 
from short-term earnings variations. As such, we argue that since institutional investors can 
affect the firm’s value as well as the disclosure patterns of the firms, we have to control for 
this effect through the addition of this control variable in our model.  
5.2.2 Analyst  
Based on our regression findings, we found that the variable concerning number of analyst 
following (ANALYST) indicates one of the most statistically significant results with p-value 
being statistically significant at 99%. We also observed that as we remove this variable and 
ran the regression again; the disclosure does not increase but in fact reduces the hedging 
premium.  This finding could probably indicate that this variable could be a confounding 
variable that might intercede the relationship between our dependent and independent 
variable. The omission of this variable will result in an omitted variable bias whereby the 
omitted variable is correlated with the error term and the independent variable. Therefore the 
omitted variable will also affect the dependent variable separately.   
This is consistent with the findings from Botosan (1997) where she argued that when a firm 
has a higher level of analyst coverage, the disclosure in the annual report is less important. In 
addition, we argue that analysts not only have a mere publishing input also a channeling 
function as they process information provided by the firm into recommendations and 
forecasts used by investors to value their investment opportunity. As such, analyst coverage 
will influence the effect of additional disclosure of the firm through earnings guidance. 
Therefore, we will need to control for the external sources of information made available to 
the public in order to correctly assess the presence of a hedging premium disclosure. With 
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the inclusion of this variable, it ensures that our model controls for the overall disclosure and 
the effect of annual report disclosure is isolated from other sources of information such as 
analyst reports. Without this variable, our results are inconclusive if the hedging disclosure 
does result in a negative premium or if this result is convoluted with external disclosure 
factors. As such, we argue that the model with “Analyst” variable is more consistent with the 
aim of our study.  
In addition, we also argue that a higher level of analyst coverage will affect the level of 
disclosure undertaken by the firm. When we observe the descriptive statistics for the good 
disclosure firms (Section 4.1) we note that within this sample, the firms have a higher mean 
for “Decentralized” dummy variable and a lower mean for “Analyst” variable. This provides 
us with an insight that the good disclosure firms tend to have a more complex hedging 
structure (activities are decentralized) and on average lower level of additional sources of 
information, which results in higher information asymmetry in these firms. Without the 
control for analyst, it could be indicative that the discounts given to the additional disclosure 
variable results from a complexity discount where by additional disclosure is only valuable 
with analyst guidance. Investors rely on analyst coverage to better understand the additional 
information disclosed. Referring back to Table 12, we note that there is a positive correlation 
co-efficient of 0.11 between good disclosure firms and number of analysts following. This 
provides some indication that the as the number of analyst increases, the disclosure also 
increases. One way to interpret this is that analyst coverage could essentially help to put the 
additional information into perspective therefore guiding the investors. Firms might not 
disclose more when there is lesser number of analysts following it as additional information 
without any guidance might confuse the investors therefore resulting in a complexity 
discount. This is also consistent with the findings from Botosan and Plumlee (2002) which 
state that when a firm has more channels of information (such as analyst coverage and media 
publications), increased disclosure leads to a much lower cost of capital than if the 
information channel is solely reliant on annual reports.  
These could be the underlying reasons why these firms disclose more than other firms, in 
order to reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and their investors. Therefore 
this reaffirms our motivation for including “Analyst” as a confounding control variable in 
our model.  
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5.3 Is there an optimal level of disclosure? 
Based on the transparency disclosure, we recognized that after some level, additional 
disclosure by the firm does not create value but in fact, results in value destruction. As prior 
literature mentioned, additional disclosure beyond a certain point results in the firm 
disclosing too much company specific information thus resulting in a strategic disadvantage 
for the firm or the information provided is too overwhelming to be appreciated by the 
investors. Therefore, firms face a tradeoff between reduced information asymmetry and 
information concerning their competitive advantage revealed to the public. 
We acknowledge however, that this optimal level of disclosure could potentially exist.	  
However, due to the limited time of our paper, we were unable to test for the optimal level of 
disclosure that the firm should aim for in terms of its additional disclosure. In order for us to 
do that, we would need to obtain more specific company information (i.e through phone 
interviews or survey) in order for us to correctly assess the optimal level of disclosure. Based 
on prior literature, the optimal level of disclosure is contingent on many factors including 
industry-specific factors, strategic competitive advantage and the cost of disseminating 
information. For example, in certain industries, revealing additional information is more 
beneficial while in some other industries, revealing more information results in firms losing 
their competitive advantage vis-a-vis their competitors. The level of disclosure for each firm 
should thus be catered to the individual needs and the environment surrounding the firm. 
Due to the time frame, these information were not made available as such, this area was 
deemed to be beyond the scope of our paper. 	  
From our study, we are unable to test the maximum level that the firm should disclosure 
before additional disclosure results in value destruction. However, we found some indication 
that at 80% additional disclosure based on our pre-defined criteria, additional disclosure does 
result in value creation. As we can see from Table 16 and 17 above, we observe that the 
hedging disclosure premium is the highest at 80%. However, as the level of additional 
disclosure increases, the hedging disclosure premium is reduced. One of the possible 
explanations for this finding is that, at a lower level of additional disclosure, the firm did not 
provide enough information for investors to understand and appreciate the hedging activities 
undertaken by the firm. As such, this is consistent with the optimal level of disclosure 
literature whereby, if investors are only provided with partial information on the 
environment and nature of the hedging disclosure, they will be left more confused. This 
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increases the information asymmetry between the investors and the firm and as such, it is 
unsurprising that the firm is given a negative hedging disclosure premium. Therefore, the 
findings indicate that either a more detailed disclosure or a very basic overview is more 
appreciated by investors. As the results suggest, any level between these two thresholds 
(60% and 80%) could be indicative to be confusing for the investors.  
5.4 Component Specific Results and Managerial Implication  
Our second hypothesis was to look at the difference in premium caused by IFRS reporting 
and additional disclosure. As such, we broke down our base model to look at the component 
specific disclosure – IFRS reporting and Additional Disclosure based on our pre-defined 
criteria listed in Section 3.2, we found the set of results listed in Table 18 above.  The result 
is inconsistent with our expectations that both IFRS reporting and Additional Disclosure 
should result in a premium on firm value. What is interesting to note is that Additional 
Disclosure creates a lower premium of 0.9% than IFRS reporting which yield a premium of 
3.00% on firm value. This could be indicative that the Additional Disclosure variable picks 
up a complexity discount as investors are forced to interpret and understand the additional 
information provided to them.  
This finding is however, consistent with our other findings that states that the higher level of 
disclosure results in a higher premium attached to the additional disclosure variable. 
Observing the findings, we found that at higher level of disclosure (80% and 90% threshold), 
the premium given increases. The finding also indicates that at lower level of additional 
disclosure, higher premium is given to IFRS reporting. An explanation to motivate this could 
be that at lower level of additional disclosure, investors rely more on the IFRS reporting 
criteria to provide them with a less complex overview of the firm’s hedging activities. As 
mentioned earlier, at lower level of additional disclosure the result might indicate that the 
information given was partial and incomplete for the investors to obtain a valuable opinion 
on the firm’s hedging activities.  
We have also ran a set of test to look at the effect if the firm deviates further from IFRS 
requirements that is to say that the firm meets the requirements of IFRS at the 80% threshold. 
From this test, we found the following results as shown in Table 22.  
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Additional Disclosure 90% 80% 70% 60% 
IFRS @ 80%  -0.043 -0.040 -0.027 -0.041 
Additional Disclosure 0.117 0.151 0.040 0.048 
Table	  22:	  Robustness	  check	  for	  Component	  Specific	  Regression	  
The result obtained from this robustness test provides us with an interesting observation. We 
note that as firms deviate away from IFRS standard requirements (ie, reducing the threshold 
from 90% to 80%) in its disclosure, the effect is a negative premium on firm’s value. We 
argue that this is consistent with our expectations that IFRS reporting act as a base for 
disclosure of the firm. The firm is expected to fulfill most of this requirement in order for 
investors to obtain sufficient insights to assess the basic hedging activities of the firm. 
However, when we observe the effect of additional disclosure, the premium given is higher 
when the level of IFRS compliance is weaker. This indicates that if firms comply with the 
IFRS requirements to a larger extend, investors place a higher value to the additional sources 
of information through the additional disclosure provided. This is in line with the 
information asymmetry argument whereby investors seek for any relevant information, 
which could allow them to have a better understanding of the firm’s hedging environment.  
The findings above allow us to obtain some insights for managerial implication. We observe 
that investors place a high value for IFRS compliance. As we look at the number of firms, 
which fulfilled the IFRS reporting criteria, we found that in general, Swedish firms have low 
IFRS compliance. Based on Table 23 below, we note that only 21.74% of our sample 
complies with 90% of the IFRS reporting criteria pre-defined in Section 3.2 while only 
45.22% comply with 80% of the same criteria. This indicates that the level of IFRS 
compliance in Sweden is low. Managers should therefore look into disclosing more 
information to the investors as our study suggests that investors do place a premium on full 
compliance of IFRS. This is an important managerial implication as we have noted that the 
more the firms deviate from strong compliance of IFRS, the more negative premium is 
attributed to the firm value.  
Criteria Number of Firms 
(Out of 115 hedging firms) 
Percentage of 
Sample 
Meeting the 90% Threshold for IFRS 25 21.74% 
Meeting the 80% Threshold for IFRS 52 45.22% 
Table	  23:	  Fulfillment	  of	  IFRS	  reporting	  Standards	  among	  Swedish	  firms 
Based on the findings presented earlier, we also noted that as firms’ deviate from a strong 
compliance of IFRS, additional disclosure becomes more positive indicating that investors 
value additional disclosure more when IFRS compliance is weaker. This is consistent with 
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disclosure literature whereby one of the basic aims of a more transparent company is to close 
the information asymmetric gap between the firm and investors.  Furthermore, it shows that 
a low information environment allows for a stronger signaling effect of firms disclosing 
additional information.  
In a weak IFRS compliance regime such as Sweden, the premium given to IFRS reporting is 
not surprising. This could be due to the fact that in such a low information environment, 
firms have the opportunity to signal higher transparency to the investors through IFRS 
compliance, in order to reduce information asymmetry between the firm and the 
investors.We would not expect a premium if every firm would fulfill the IFRS requirements 
to a large extent as this would create comparability among firms since it is a requirement for 
listing on the stock exchange. However, when firm deviates away from IFRS compliance, 
this comparability is less possible and investors thus provide a premium for those firms, 
which try to reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and investors.  
The analysis above is consistent with an empirical study done by Daske et al (2008). In their 
study, they found that market liquidity and equity valuation are higher for firms after the 
introduction of IFRS standards. Furthermore, they found a higher positive effect for 
companies fulfilling IFRS requirements earlier on a voluntary basis. This could be an 
argument for a signaling effect within a low information environment. 
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6  Conclusion 
In conclusion, it was found that the level of IFRS requirement compliance for the Swedish 
listed firms assessed within our sample is lower than expected, especially considering the 
fact that IFRS is a mandatory listing requirement of the Swedish stock exchange. This 
answers our first research question on the IFRS compliance level within Sweden.  Generally, 
the low level of compliance could possibly suggest that Sweden belongs to a weak IFRS 
enforcement regime. This seems to allow firms, which comply with the IFRS requirements 
to generate a disclosure premium above others, which do not.  
In our study, we also found an indication for a positive impact of good hedging disclosure on 
the hedging premium in line with our first hypothesis. Based on our initial model, when 
firms comply with IFRS requirements at the 90% threshold and provide about 60% 
additional information while controlling for accessibility of the information provided, the 
increase in the hedging premium was found to be around 4.10%. Varying the thresholds, we 
found the premium to be as large as 7.50%. It is interesting to point out that this finding only 
holds when the number of analyst following the firm is controlled for. Otherwise, the 
premium is negative or insignificant. This provides some indication that analyst coverage 
increases the value of the additional information provided as they provide a channel and 
guidance for investors to further process the disclosed information. Also our findings 
suggest a negative premium between 60-80% additional disclosure threshold indicating that 
the market values either low level of disclosure or detailed disclosure. This could be referred 
to the complexity discount whereby market rewards a premium for additional disclosure that 
is not confusing and up to a certain threshold, the information might be partial and 
insufficient for the investors therefore, leading to a discount instead of a premium. 
In addition, contrary to what we expected in our second hypothesis, controlling for IFRS 
compliance at 90% threshold, additional disclosure did not create a higher premium on 
firm’s value than IFRS. However, when we ran the test again by changing the IFRS 
threshold to 80%, premium awarded for additional disclosure increases. This indicates that 
when firms deviate away from IFRS compliance, additional information becomes more 
valuable as these provide the investors with the opportunity to assess the firm’s risk 
management environment.  
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7  Future Research 
Within our paper we have researched for the influence of hedging disclosure on the hedging 
premium based on a number of pre-specified criteria. The scope limitations derived from the 
short time frame of our thesis prevented us from covering additional areas that could be of 
interest within this topic.  
In our study, we acknowledge that there could potentially be an optimal level of disclosure. 
Based on previous research, it was noted that there should exist an optimal level of 
disclosure whereby beyond which, additional disclosure is value destructing and leads to a 
discount. This is as a result of revealing company sensitive information and thus reducing 
the competitive advantage for the firm. In addition, based on the investors’ point of view, 
additional disclosure beyond a certain point just serves to confuse and drown the investors 
without actually creating value. Therefore further research could look into testing for the 
optimal level of disclosure.   
We also did not take into account the quality of the information provided in our study due to 
the time constraints. According to Beretta and Bolozzan (2004), the richness of disclosure 
communication and the quality of information could also affect the way the investors 
perceive the information. Most of the transparency research focused on disclosure in terms 
of the quantity of the disclosure information while neglecting the quality aspect. We 
observed in our study that a firm with more number of pages in their annual report does not 
necessarily present clear and valuable information. As such we argue that, further research 
should include and focus on this aspect of disclosure.  
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9  Appendices  
9.1 Appendix A: Multivariate regression results 	  
The following table presents the regression results as we vary the additional disclosure 
threshold in our model between 60-90% while keeping accessibility and IFRS threshold 
constant at 90%. 
IFRS 90 Disc 60 Disc 70 Disc 80 Disc 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.803         5.475***         1.818         5.482***         1.868         5.711***         1.868         5.665***     
Energy     0.150         0.490         0.170         0.542         0.185         0.599         0.181         0.595     
Material -   0.034     -   0.164         0.021         0.104         0.021         0.103         0.033         0.163     
Industry     0.216         1.066         0.250         1.252         0.241         1.215         0.265         1.352     
Discretionary     0.274         1.337         0.308         1.528         0.299         1.479         0.324         1.629     
Staples     0.167         0.502         0.182         0.554         0.196         0.598         0.178         0.542     
Health_Care     0.774         2.852***         0.770         2.867***         0.766         2.857***         0.782         2.927***     
Financials     0.260         1.225         0.290         1.388         0.295         1.411         0.306         1.483     
IT     0.135         0.650         0.178         0.866         0.164         0.800         0.186         0.920     
Div     0.082         1.578         0.069         1.243         0.076         1.404         0.070         1.240     
Ind -   0.065     -   1.301     -   0.086     -   1.723*     -   0.090     -   1.784*     -   0.093     -   1.829*     
Leverage -   0.253     -   1.722*     -   0.264     -   1.767*     -   0.269     -   1.817*     -   0.279     -   1.865*     
Capex     0.997         1.479         1.086         1.621         0.984         1.492         1.030         1.520     
Size -   0.315     -   6.860***     -   0.323     -   6.834***     -   0.331     -   7.161***     -   0.332     -   7.113***     
Foreign     0.002         2.433**         0.002         2.162**         0.002         2.455**         0.002         2.356**     
MgmtShares -   0.167     -   0.822     -   0.202     -   0.986     -   0.173     -   0.857     -   0.185     -   0.918     
ROA     0.292         1.203         0.352         1.440         0.328         1.343         0.344         1.391     
BlockOwnership -   0.000     -   0.062         0.000         0.112         0.000         0.196         0.000         0.241     
Analyst     0.023         4.620***         0.025         4.965***         0.025         5.085***         0.026         5.161***     
Institutional -   0.027     -   0.259         0.006         0.057     -   0.010     -   0.090     -   0.010     -   0.090     
GDF     0.120         1.592         0.074         0.762         0.148         1.404         0.137         1.055     
BDF     0.079         1.338         0.084         1.436         0.073         1.258         0.070         1.206     
R-squared 0.434 0.431 0.436 0.439 
Adjusted R-squared 0.364 0.361 0.367 0.370 	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9.2 Appendix B: Multivariate regression results w/o analyst variable 	  
The following table presents the regression results as we removed the analyst variable as a 
control. We have also varied the additional disclosure threshold in our model between 60-
90% while keeping accessibility and IFRS threshold constant at 90%. 
IFRS 90 w/o Analyst Disc 60 Disc 70 Disc 80 Disc 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.184         4.493***         1.211         4.842***         1.147         4.472***         1.059         4.099***     
Energy -   0.158     -   0.482     -   0.170     -   0.480     -   0.196     -   0.556     -   0.211     -   0.582     
Material -   0.362     -   2.495**     -   0.364     -   2.590**     -   0.331     -   2.374**     -   0.322     -   2.272**     
Industry -   0.100     -   0.764     -   0.095     -   0.713     -   0.092     -   0.711     -   0.092     -   0.704     
Discretionary     0.019         0.133     -   0.001     -   0.007         0.007         0.049         0.020         0.136     
Staples -   0.038     -   0.103     -   0.005     -   0.016     -   0.020     -   0.062         0.001         0.004     
Health_Care     0.700         2.696***         0.678         2.589**         0.671         2.561**         0.667         2.523**     
Financials -   0.084     -   0.611     -   0.066     -   0.477     -   0.082     -   0.603     -   0.090     -   0.656     
IT -   0.208     -   1.471     -   0.197     -   1.380     -   0.182     -   1.281     -   0.177     -   1.233     
Div     0.087         1.590         0.096         1.843*         0.084         1.494         0.073         1.255     
Ind -   0.011     -   0.219         0.017         0.343     -   0.019     -   0.382     -   0.026     -   0.499     
Leverage -   0.010     -   0.075     -   0.001     -   0.006         0.014         0.105     -   0.002     -   0.013     
Capex     0.913         1.110         1.075         1.375         1.042         1.303         0.980         1.216     
Size -   0.170     -   4.566***     -   0.182     -   5.209***     -   0.168     -   4.601***     -   0.152     -   4.077***     
Foreign     0.002         2.522**         0.002         2.731***         0.003         2.711***         0.002         2.571**     
MgmtShares -   0.402     -   3.240***     -   0.350     -   2.818***     -   0.342     -   2.754***     -   0.347     -   2.803***     
ROA     0.070         0.281         0.112         0.462         0.132         0.525         0.163         0.645     
BlockOwnership -   0.002     -   1.914*     -   0.002     -   2.222**     -   0.002     -   1.866*     -   0.002     -   1.766*     
Institutional     0.143         1.112         0.143         1.188         0.158         1.246         0.166         1.277     
GDF     0.163         2.079**         0.111         1.489         0.111         1.210         0.090         0.786     
BDF     0.169         3.015***         0.184         3.358***         0.164         2.894***         0.155         2.734***     
R-squared 0.622 0.590 0.617 0.609 
Adjusted R-squared 0.578 0.543 0.573 0.563 	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9.3 Appendix C: Robustness check at 80% IFRS reporting threshold 	  
The following table presents the regression results as we changed the IFRS threshold to 80% 
while varying the additional disclosure threshold in our model between 60-90% and keeping 
accessibility constant.  
IFRS 80 Disc 60 Disc 70 Disc 80 Disc 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.838         5.117***         1.812         5.401***         1.845         5.669***         1.868         5.665***     
Energy     0.223         0.686         0.168         0.519         0.176         0.574         0.181         0.595     
Material     0.035         0.152         0.040         0.193         0.005         0.023         0.033         0.163     
Industry     0.283         1.259         0.269         1.322         0.229         1.153         0.265         1.352     
Discretionary     0.337         1.496         0.340         1.646         0.284         1.404         0.324         1.629     
Staples     0.209         0.574         0.193         0.577         0.189         0.579         0.178         0.542     
Health_Care     0.852         2.918***         0.786         2.863***         0.759         2.841***         0.782         2.927***     
Financials     0.312         1.340         0.297         1.397         0.277         1.327         0.306         1.483     
IT     0.200         0.871         0.188         0.901         0.148         0.721         0.186         0.920     
Div     0.072         1.312         0.066         1.128         0.079         1.510         0.070         1.240     
Ind -   0.083     -   1.668*     -   0.088     -   1.740*     -   0.087     -   1.736*     -   0.093     -   1.829*     
Leverage -   0.352     -   2.311**     -   0.270     -   1.768*     -   0.256     -   1.737*     -   0.279     -   1.865*     
Capex     1.237         1.927*         1.063         1.500         0.987         1.509         1.030         1.520     
Size -   0.324     -   6.663***     -   0.325     -   6.869***     -   0.325     -   7.110***     -   0.332     -   7.113***     
Foreign     0.002         1.726*         0.002         2.211**         0.002         2.454**         0.002         2.356**     
MgmtShares -   0.172     -   0.832     -   0.222     -   1.115     -   0.168     -   0.828     -   0.185     -   0.918     
ROA     0.336         1.372         0.385         1.547         0.306         1.261         0.344         1.391     
BlockOwnership     0.000         0.090         0.000         0.159         0.000         0.140         0.000         0.241     
Analyst     0.026         5.311***         0.025         5.111***         0.024         4.936***         0.026         5.161***     
Institutional     0.006         0.052         0.014         0.128     -   0.011     -   0.100     -   0.010     -   0.090     
GDF     0.072         1.020         0.024         0.237         0.144         1.548         0.137         1.055     
BDF     0.077         1.270         0.082         1.406         0.075         1.295         0.070         1.206     
R-squared 0.452 0.432 0.436 0.439 
Adjusted R-squared 0.385 0.363 0.367 0.370 	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9.4 Appendix D: Robustness check at IFRS 80% w/o Analyst variable  	  
The following table presents the regression results as we removed the analyst variable as a 
control in the model at IFRS 80% threshold. We have also varied the additional disclosure 
threshold in our model between 60-90% while keeping accessibility constant.  
IFRS 80 w/o Analyst Disc 60 Disc 70 Disc 80 Disc 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.077         3.823***         1.129         4.279***         1.163         4.529***         1.059         4.099***     
Energy -   0.210     -   0.581     -   0.239     -   0.605     -   0.188     -   0.531     -   0.211     -   0.582     
Material -   0.312     -   2.080**     -   0.299     -   2.016**     -   0.347     -   2.450**     -   0.322     -   2.272**     
Industry -   0.084     -   0.593     -   0.090     -   0.636     -   0.114     -   0.857     -   0.092     -   0.704     
Discretionary     0.048         0.308         0.056         0.348     -   0.041     -   0.278         0.020         0.136     
Staples     0.011         0.030     -   0.096     -   0.289     -   0.048     -   0.148         0.001         0.004     
Health_Care     0.676         2.491**         0.664         2.390**         0.675         2.558**         0.667         2.523**     
Financials -   0.084     -   0.580     -   0.038     -   0.263     -   0.092     -   0.652     -   0.090     -   0.656     
IT -   0.184     -   1.200     -   0.174     -   1.161     -   0.193     -   1.334     -   0.177     -   1.233     
Div     0.048         0.790         0.059         1.051         0.081         1.469         0.073         1.255     
Ind -   0.010     -   0.192         0.032         0.676     -   0.025     -   0.498     -   0.026     -   0.499     
Leverage -   0.036     -   0.271     -   0.050     -   0.377         0.049         0.366     -   0.002     -   0.013     
Capex     1.127         1.409         1.211         1.476         0.884         1.080         0.980         1.216     
Size -   0.154     -   3.830***     -   0.175     -   4.864***     -   0.168     -   4.648***     -   0.152     -   4.077***     
Foreign     0.002         2.066**         0.002         2.308**         0.003         2.916***         0.002         2.571**     
MgmtShares -   0.378     -   2.957***     -   0.362     -   2.866***     -   0.305     -   2.570**     -   0.347     -   2.803***     
ROA     0.197         0.767         0.222         0.882         0.125         0.507         0.163         0.645     
BlockOwnership -   0.002     -   1.651     -   0.002     -   1.817*     -   0.002     -   1.960*     -   0.002     -   1.766*     
Institutional     0.216         1.577         0.265         2.236**         0.158         1.267         0.166         1.277     
GDF     0.173         2.102**         0.093         1.157         0.105         1.250         0.090         0.786     
BDF     0.148         2.623***         0.174         3.278***         0.167         2.916***         0.155         2.734***     
R-squared 0.608 0.549 0.621 0.609 
Adjusted R-squared 0.563 0.496 0.577 0.563 	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9.5 Appendix E: Component specific regression results  	  
The following table presents the regression results as we look into the specific components 
of our model – IFRS threshold at 90% and Additional Disclosure varied between 60% - 90% 
thresholds. This is to observe the difference in impact created by the different component on 
the firm value.  
IFRS 90 separated AD 60 AD 70 AD 80 AD 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.818         4.975***         1.908         5.278***         2.009         5.803***         1.899         5.408***     
Hedger     0.068         1.048         0.077         1.196         0.076         1.168         0.082         1.259     
Energy     0.092         0.290         0.079         0.229         0.156         0.482         0.167         0.529     
Material     0.021         0.092         0.007         0.029         0.014         0.063         0.007         0.030     
Industry     0.233         1.033         0.191         0.845         0.175         0.795         0.186         0.858     
Discretionary     0.312         1.379         0.271         1.195         0.279         1.247         0.272         1.237     
Staples -   0.057     -   0.170     -   0.070     -   0.222         0.034         0.102         0.030         0.087     
Health_Care     0.862         2.938***         0.805         2.731***         0.852         2.966***         0.866         3.053***     
Financials     0.273         1.170         0.257         1.103         0.275         1.191         0.250         1.104     
IT     0.181         0.788         0.143         0.624         0.141         0.625         0.138         0.618     
Div     0.056         0.979         0.074         1.326         0.083         1.652         0.088         1.683*     
Ind -   0.066     -   1.272     -   0.078     -   1.495     -   0.059     -   1.135     -   0.071     -   1.323     
Leverage -   0.208     -   1.399     -   0.195     -   1.283     -   0.267     -   1.786*     -   0.237     -   1.569     
Capex     1.047         1.707*         0.840         1.210         0.567         0.809         0.612         0.869     
Size -   0.323     -   6.218***     -   0.333     -   6.344***     -   0.344     -   6.873***     -   0.326     -   6.404***     
Foreign     0.002         2.177**         0.002         2.278**         0.002         2.596**         0.002         2.349**     
MgmtShares -   0.239     -   0.981     -   0.323     -   1.305     -   0.217     -   0.953     -   0.221     -   0.989     
ROA     0.382         1.537         0.396         1.604         0.316         1.290         0.294         1.185     
BlockOwnership     0.000         0.301         0.000         0.208         0.000         0.039         0.000         0.079     
Analyst     0.024         4.546***         0.025         4.461***         0.025         4.654***         0.024         4.517***     
Institutional -   0.000     -   0.003         0.013         0.121     -   0.024     -   0.250     -   0.022     -   0.211     
Decentralized -   0.002     -   0.041     -   0.011     -   0.164     -   0.007     -   0.128     -   0.020     -   0.346     
IFRS_90     0.030         0.465         0.090         1.290         0.048       0.850         0.035       0.578     
AD     0.009       0.155     -   0.066     - 0.712         0.066       0.735         0.068       0.622     
R-squared 0.435 0.430 0.464 0.440 
Adjusted R-squared 0.358 0.353 0.391 0.364 	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9.6 Appendix F: Component specific regression w/o analyst variable  	  
The following table presents the regression results as we look into the specific components 
of our model – IFRS threshold at 90% and Additional Disclosure varied between 60% - 90% 
thresholds while removing the analyst control variable.  
IFRS 90 separated 
w/o Analyst 
AD 60 AD 70 AD 80 AD 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.213         4.523***         1.455         6.239***         1.309         5.040***         1.325         5.200***     
Hedger     0.167         2.617***         0.159         2.484**         0.166         2.573**         0.158         2.452**     
Energy -   0.165     -   0.456     -   0.107     -   0.278     -   0.112     -   0.312     -   0.116     -   0.315     
Material -   0.364     -   2.221**     -   0.361     -   2.326**     -   0.386     -   2.418**     -   0.406     -   2.541**     
Industry -   0.098     -   0.689     -   0.141     -   0.948     -   0.123     -   0.888     -   0.140     -   1.007     
Discretionary     0.014         0.084         0.025         0.155     -   0.030     -   0.194     -   0.037     -   0.237     
Staples -   0.001     -   0.003     -   0.187     -   0.713     -   0.049     -   0.170     -   0.044     -   0.142     
Health_Care     0.771         2.887***         0.775         2.791***         0.776         2.945***         0.778         2.899***     
Financials -   0.115     -   0.758     -   0.133     -   0.859     -   0.132     -   0.899     -   0.149     -   1.003     
IT -   0.202     -   1.319     -   0.284     -   1.838*     -   0.223     -   1.517     -   0.243     -   1.630     
Div     0.129         2.365**         0.168         3.794***         0.145         2.908***         0.151         3.120     
Ind -   0.022     -   0.429         0.020         0.436     -   0.009     -   0.164     -   0.010     -   0.192     
Leverage -   0.008     -   0.060     -   0.055     -   0.429         0.048         0.340         0.050         0.367     
Capex     0.468         0.567     -   0.310     -   0.415         0.281         0.335         0.237         0.295     
Size -   0.171     -   4.561***     -   0.196     -   6.202***     -   0.187     -   5.084***     -   0.187     -   5.158***     
Foreign     0.002         2.668***         0.003         3.246***         0.003         3.042***         0.003         3.036***     
MgmtShares -   0.387     -   2.720***     -   0.418     -   2.643***     -   0.335     -   2.243**     -   0.354     -   2.535**     
ROA     0.128         0.488         0.169         0.682         0.175         0.669         0.150         0.571     
BlockOwnership -   0.002     -   2.071**     -   0.003     -   3.538***     -   0.002     -   2.266**     -   0.002     -   2.345**     
Institutional     0.101         0.772         0.054         0.532         0.083         0.666         0.079         0.622     
Decentralized -   0.020     -   0.314     -   0.033     -   0.675     -   0.016     -   0.282         0.000         0.008     
IFRS_90     0.028         0.469         0.086         1.751*         0.037         0.584         0.049         0.843     
AD -   0.033     -   0.527     -   0.147     -   2.852***     -   0.065     - 0.878     -   0.070     - 0.843     
R-squared 0.461 0.568 0.456 0.466 
Adjusted R-squared 0.391 0.512 0.386 0.397 	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9.7 Appendix G: Component specific robustness test  	  
The following table presents the regression results as we look into the specific components 
of our model – IFRS threshold at 80% and Additional Disclosure varied between 60% - 90% 
thresholds. This is to observe the difference in impact created by the different component on 
the firm value.  
IFRS 80 separated AD 60 AD 70 AD 80 AD 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.858         4.846***         1.892         4.925***         1.903         5.097***         1.827         4.820***     
Hedger     0.090         1.315         0.104         1.494         0.079         1.165         0.090         1.304     
Energy     0.252         0.764         0.282         0.828         0.282         0.883         0.249         0.788     
Material     0.069         0.285         0.122         0.510         0.132         0.547         0.112         0.475     
Industry     0.318         1.347         0.323         1.390         0.331         1.413         0.342         1.479     
Discretionary     0.357         1.524         0.391         1.673*         0.377         1.616         0.383         1.671*     
Staples     0.135         0.375         0.218         0.602         0.136         0.382         0.100         0.283     
Health_Care     0.837         2.825***         0.834         2.816***         0.820         2.811***         0.850         2.912***     
Financials     0.340         1.400         0.369         1.528         0.384         1.585         0.378         1.581     
IT     0.240         0.995         0.258         1.086         0.255         1.062         0.271         1.145     
Div     0.054         0.940         0.053         0.887         0.063         1.197         0.057         1.009     
Ind -   0.097     -   1.829*     -   0.105     -   1.953*     -   0.118     -   2.221**     -   0.114     -   2.120**     
Leverage -   0.296     -   1.881*     -   0.283     -   1.759*     -   0.309     -   1.978**     -   0.285     -   1.813*     
Capex     1.071         1.581         0.900         1.262         0.952         1.502         0.992         1.565     
Size -   0.335     -   6.289***     -   0.348     -   6.367***     -   0.347     -   6.677***     -   0.335     -   6.280***     
Foreign     0.002         1.719*         0.002         1.899*         0.002         2.332**         0.002         2.219**     
MgmtShares -   0.196     -   1.040     -   0.222     -   1.162     -   0.179     -   1.037     -   0.200     -   1.143     
ROA     0.418         1.647         0.515         1.994**         0.411         1.628         0.408         1.600     
BlockOwnership     0.001         0.547         0.001         0.822         0.001         0.694         0.001         0.625     
Analyst     0.028         5.319***         0.029         5.528***         0.030         5.649***         0.029         5.389***     
Institutional -   0.003     -   0.022         0.010         0.087     -   0.035     -   0.325     -   0.035     -   0.316     
Decentralized -   0.016     -   0.248     -   0.024     -   0.376     -   0.017     -   0.304     -   0.025     -   0.379     
IFRS_80 -   0.041     -   0.596     -   0.027     -   0.410     -   0.040     - 0.634     -   0.043     - 0.668     
AD 0.048 0.730 0.040 0.400 0.151 1.745* 0.117 0.950 
R-squared 0.446 0.437 0.469 0.461 
Adjusted R-squared 0.371 0.360 0.397 0.388 	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9.8 Appendix H: Component specific robustness w/o Analyst variable 	  
The following table presents the regression results as we look into the specific components 
of our model – IFRS threshold at 80% and Additional Disclosure varied between 60% - 90% 
thresholds while removing the analyst control variable.  
IFRS 80 separated 
w/o Analyst 
AD 60 AD 70 AD 80 AD 90 
  Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
const     1.111         3.747***         1.177         3.877***         1.190         3.956***         1.195         3.941***     
Hedger     0.155         2.302**         0.142         2.133**         0.157         2.373**         0.148         2.241**     
Energy -   0.148     -   0.432     -   0.196     -   0.545     -   0.158     -   0.474     -   0.175     -   0.510     
Material -   0.306     -   1.777*     -   0.325     -   1.916*     -   0.327     -   1.937*     -   0.319     -   1.854*     
Industry -   0.052     -   0.325     -   0.062     -   0.384     -   0.066     -   0.426     -   0.076     -   0.475     
Discretionary     0.047         0.268         0.053         0.308         0.024         0.140         0.032         0.183     
Staples     0.113         0.314         0.072         0.209         0.087         0.246         0.099         0.277     
Health_Care     0.738         2.709***         0.619         2.320**         0.650         2.456**         0.641         2.379**     
Financials -   0.084     -   0.512     -   0.066     -   0.401     -   0.076     -   0.473     -   0.073     -   0.450     
IT -   0.163     -   0.958     -   0.175     -   1.042     -   0.195     -   1.188     -   0.191     -   1.144     
Div     0.094         1.605         0.091         1.546         0.114         2.075**         0.097         1.713*     
Ind -   0.006     -   0.120     -   0.000     -   0.009     -   0.018     -   0.337     -   0.013     -   0.251     
Leverage -   0.026     -   0.195     -   0.048     -   0.339         0.004         0.030     -   0.019     -   0.135     
Capex     1.109         1.422         1.103         1.387         1.101         1.429         1.145         1.476     
Size -   0.163     -   4.095***     -   0.176     -   4.281***     -   0.181     -   4.513***     -   0.181     -   4.388***     
Foreign     0.002         2.395**         0.002         2.474**         0.003         2.840***         0.002         2.502**     
MgmtShares -   0.323     -   1.921*     -   0.346     -   2.280**     -   0.305     -   1.877*     -   0.322     -   1.976**     
ROA     0.175         0.663         0.298         1.128         0.149         0.567         0.225         0.844     
BlockOwnership -   0.002     -   2.101**     -   0.002     -   1.747*     -   0.002     -   1.763*     -   0.002     -   1.645     
Institutional     0.158         1.124         0.199         1.413         0.190         1.389         0.220         1.544     
Decentralized -   0.035     -   0.528     -   0.018     -   0.258     -   0.036     -   0.555     -   0.018     -   0.252     
IFRS_80     0.005         0.065         0.046         0.649         0.015         0.214         0.032         0.456     
AD -   0.013     -   0.178     -   0.085     -   1.091     -   0.016     - 0.195     -   0.063     - 0.600     
R-squared 0.408 0.418 0.417 0.402 
Adjusted R-squared 0.332 0.343 0.342 0.325 	  	   	  
	   78	  
9.9 Appendix I: Example of Good Disclosure Company 
To provide an example of a good disclosure firm, we have chosen an abstract out of 
Trelleborg Group5 Risk Management section from their Annual Report 2009. Trelleborg 
Group is one of the five companies in our study, which has fulfilled the 90 percent threshold 
of the additional disclosure criteria.  
In the abstract, we note that the company has provided most of the information required in 
our assessment; both qualitative and quantitative.  The company has provided a table 
defining financial risks the company is exposed to before elaborating on the effect the risk 
has on the business. These are in line with some of the IFRS specific criteria within our 
assessment.  In addition, from these two-page abstract, we noted that the company has also 
fulfilled the pre-specified additional disclosure criteria listed in out assessment. For example, 
the company went on to provide information regarding the risk management policies in place 
as well as numerical breakdown of the exposure.  
In this abstract, it is shown that all the information we require is easily accessible without us 
having to go through the annual report to find the information in different parts of the report. 
The way the report is organized guides the reader to the relevant sections within the annual 
report for the information required.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Abstract was retrieved from Trelleborg Group Annual Report 2009 at the company’s website: 
http://www.trelleborg.com/en/Investors/Reports/ 
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